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INTERPRETING FORCE AUTHORIZATION 
SCOTT M. SULLIVAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article presents a theory of authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs) 
that reconciles separation of power failures in the current interpretive model. Existing doc-
trine applies the same text-driven models of statutory interpretation to AUMFs that are 
utilized with all other legal instruments. However, the conditions at birth, objectives, and 
expected impacts underlying military force authorizations differ dramatically from typical 
legislation. AUMFs are focused but temporary corrective interventions intended to change 
the underlying facts that prompted their passage. This Article examines historical practice 
and utilizes institutionalist principles to develop a theory of AUMF decay that eschews text 
in favor of time. Consistent with armed conflict, functional needs, and constitutional norms, 
AUMF decay offers a model that harnesses the institutional advantages and interplay em-
bedded in separation of powers regime. Properly, AUMF interpretation recognizes their pe-
culiar role and lifespan as one that explodes into the legal landscape with supernova inten-
sity and potency that, regardless of text, is just as surely followed by an accelerating decay 
that ultimately diminishes to complete inoperability.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The most visible and publicly accessible national security act un-
dertaken by Congress, “declaring war” is a vestige of the past, unlikely  
                                                                                                                                 
 * Harvey A. Peltier, Sr. Associate Professor of Law, LSU Law Center; Associate, 
University of Texas Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law. I am grate-
ful to Michael Coenen, Jack Goldsmith, Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, David Sloss, and 
Ernie Young for their comments and insight during the progression of this Article. 
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to be revived in the foreseeable future. Post-World War II, declara-
tions of war have been overtaken by statutory authorizations for the 
use of military force (“AUMFs”).  
 Like declarations, which presume a yet-to-be-determined end 
date, Congress’s authorizations of force are accompanied by implicit 
expirations. While they lack the gravitas of declarations of war in 
public consciousness, AUMFs behave relatively similarly to their 
predecessors. They explode into the legal landscape with supernova 
intensity, briefly outshine the broader legal constellation and, at 
their birth, are bound only by the functional concerns surrounding 
armed conflict. As time passes, AUMFs rapidly mature, the potency 
and breadth of their authority increasingly constricted until they are 
rendered fully inoperable. In short, they decay. The interpretive tools 
that once stood as initial limitations are insufficient to empower an 
AUMF’s plainly visible grants of power, and the AUMF lies dormant 
in the annals of federal code—forgotten, or worse, actively ignored. 
 Dominant models of statutory interpretation preclude the decay 
that afflicts force authorizations. These models understand the scope 
of authority of federal legislation to lie at an unchanging, fixed point.1 
As such, the contours of statutory authority flow only from textually 
embedded internal limitations and the external boundaries set by 
hierarchically superior law.2  
 The static, text-driven approach in current doctrine fails to reflect 
historical practice or comport with the particular context, broad ef-
fects, and structural challenges that force authorizations pose to the 
liberal democratic society. In responding to national security cases 
invoking force authorizations, the judiciary has feigned doctrinal 
obedience while effectuating doctrinal usurpation. While the result-
ing opinions are inconsistent, they present a broad pattern of recog-
nition that the institutional principles embedded in constitutional 
separation of powers not only counsel AUMF decay, they demand it.  
 This Article argues that the most important aspect in interpreting 
the scope of congressional force authorizations is not text, but time. 
The insufficiency of current doctrine to account for temporal condi-
tions is manifest. As Congress debated heightened tensions in the 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. There are exceptions to this general rule of statutory immutability, most notably 
the rule of desuetude in which a statute is considered inoperable based on a long period of 
non-enforcement. The extreme conditions necessary to give rise to desuetude reflect the 
strength of the rule. See generally Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209 (2006) (outlin-
ing various arguments leading to rare use of desuetude doctrine). Likewise, the stakes of 
desuetude are absolute. The statute is either completely inoperative or completely  
authoritative.  
 2. In this context, such “internal limitations” include not only the parameters of au-
thority set out by the text of individual statutes, but also the limitations existing within 
statutory law as a whole, which often carry provisions applicable to the understanding of 
other statutes.  
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Middle East, one member expressed “shock” that the President al-
ready possessed congressional authorization for force in the region 
per a 1957 statute.3 As the congressman points out, the “all but for-
gotten” resolution “places in the hands of the President the exclusive 
authority to make the determination that military action is required 
and to order into action military forces without limit [and] . . . re-
lieves the President even of the necessity of consulting with the Con-
gress . . . .”4 These comments, made in 1969, express unequivocal 
fears of the operability of a “forgotten” resolution passed only a dec-
ade prior.5 Forty-five years later, that same 1957 resolution remains 
in full force on the statute books.6  
 Defining the contours of an alternative, or at least augmenting, 
framework for interpreting force authorizations grows more urgent 
as contemporary conflicts grow more amorphous. We face parallel 
questions to those brought up in 1969, the resolution of which are 
murky and complex (e.g., how does the scope of the 2001 AUMF im-
plemented after 9/11 apply to newly developing terrorist threats?).7 
Understanding force authorizations to decay would affect the ap-
plicability of existing AUMFs, the necessity of future AUMFs, and 
the drafting of any new AUMFs.  
 In Part I of this Article, I set out the role and import of AUMFs 
over history by outlaying their constitutional, statutory, and declara-
tive significance. In Part II, I analyze authorizations for force imple-
mented over the past sixty years and the corresponding executive 
actions taken under their power. This analysis reveals and circum-
scribes an invisible doctrine that has intuitively been applied by the 
Executive relative to AUMFs and which greatly differs from other 
statutory interpretation regimes. Executive AUMF interpretation, as 
practiced, flows from acknowledgements of the institutional deficien-
cies structurally accounted for in constitutional design of the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                 
 3. 115 CONG. REC. 40,228 (1969) (statement of Rep. Findley) (explaining that the 
existence of the authorization would be “a shock—to most Americans, including, I daresay, 
most of the Members of Congress”). 
 4. Id.  
 5. 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 85-7, § 2, 71 Stat. 5 
(1957)). 
 6. Id. 
 7. While governmental and public attention has been trained on the group known as 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), there is increasing reason to believe that 
other groups pose even more substantial and imminent threats to United States national 
security. See Mark Mazzetti, Michael S. Schmidt, & Ben Hubbard, U.S. Suspects More 
Direct Threats Beyond ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/09/21/world/middleeast/us-sees-other-more-direct-threats-beyond-isis-.html?_r=1 
(citing governmental officials as saying that the “intense focus on [ISIS] had distorted the 
picture of the terrorism . . . and that the more immediate threats still come from tradition-
al terror groups like Khorasan and the Nusra Front”). 
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government as well as the process of force authorizations, which 
Congress deliberates with time and informational constricts unchar-
acteristic of status quo statutory deliberations.  
 Part III demonstrates that the statutory decay observable in con-
gressional and executive behavior, while never explicitly articulated 
as such, reflects planned obsolescence with behavioral patterns that 
follow four phases of decay from ultimate authority to none at all. As 
I outline and define, these phases progress through periods of text-
less conflict functionalism, text-based executive constraint, textless 
democratic functionalism, and total inoperability. As I argue, making 
visible the “invisible” decay of AUMFs, formulating AUMF decay 
theory, and solidifying interpretive doctrine distinct from other stat-
utes offers critical institutional advantages. In concluding Part III, I 
articulate the underpinnings of a new theoretical model for AUMF 
decay based upon the foregoing analysis.  
 Adopting interpretive doctrine for AUMFs is overdue and of ut-
most utility. As I write this Article, the American public and interna-
tional community watch with trepidation and concern as President 
Obama, his national security team, and Congress contemplate their 
roles on behalf of the United States in using force against the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). With upcoming congressional 
elections in the back of everyone’s minds, the Executive and legisla-
ture must determine what authorizations exist upon which they can 
rely, whether new AUMFs should be made and of what nature, and 
the practical and political implications of any action they take or de-
cline. Quite simply, AUMFs matter. A model for their interpretation 
must be implemented that accounts for statutory decay in order to 
maintain separation of powers generally (and respect the Youngs-
town assessment specifically), enhance operational clarity, and im-
prove democratic legitimacy in the most sensitive and costly of all 
national security decisions—military force.  
II.   THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF  
AUTHORIZING FORCE 
 U.S. Presidents since Lincoln have always had an expansive view 
of their own authority. As the decades have passed, the historical ba-
sis for an expansive view of presidential authority in the discretion-
ary use of the armed forces has only grown, especially within the 
province of initiating hostilities. So why would a President seek Con-
gress’s authorization for the use of military force?  
 The post-9/11 era of national security scholarship has focused on 
executive power. This emphasis is understandable. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the executive branch steadily gathered power as 
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Congress steadily ceded it.8 Transfer of authority to the President 
reflected changes in both the governmental and factual landscape.9 
Executive consolidation of power was especially potent in foreign re-
lations, the scope of which grew as U.S. and foreign interests became 
increasingly interconnected and which caused the migration of policy 
questions once considered squarely within the purview of domestic 
politics to enter the realm of “foreign policy.”10  
 Simultaneously, the formal role of Congress in initiating hostili-
ties was waning. By the mid-twentieth century, the highly visible 
national security act undertaken by Congress, “declaring war” was a 
vestige of the past, unlikely to be revived any time in the near fu-
ture.11 Setting aside disagreements as to the Framers’ intent and the 
legal significance of such declarations once served, there can be little 
disagreement that the Congress’s abandonment of the declaration is 
interpreted by the public as equivalent to the abandoning of its re-
sponsibility in regulating the initiation (or continuation) of armed 
hostilities.12  
 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the most 
pressing questions of national security policy constitutionality have 
focused on challenges to executive power.13 Detention, interrogation, 
                                                                                                                                 
 8. As a legal matter, nothing exemplifies this process more than the consolidation 
and validation of the administrative state—a regime in which Congress opted for the safety 
of broad stroke policy direction exercised by agencies guided by executive branch  
prerogatives. 
 9. Governmentally, the rise of the administrative state and an enhanced apprecia-
tion of the institutional advantages of the executive branch in seeking swift and cohesive 
action, were both drivers of the consolidation of executive power. 
 10. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 301 (2005) (comparing the post-9/11 period and the 
Great Depression and concluding that “[g]lobalization has launched a similar transfor-
mation [of presidential power], with the same chance of constitutional confrontation and 
breakdown, as the one that occurred almost a century ago”). 
 11. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 320 (2002). 
 12. As to the question of the lawful initiation of force, there can be little doubt as to 
the sufficiency of congressional authorizations (in lieu of formal declarations). See Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2059 (2005) (“[A]lmost no one argues today that Congress’s authoriza-
tion must take the form of a declaration of war.”). But this does not mean that congression-
al authorizations satisfy all the same purposes as declarations. Declarations are not char-
acterized by the same particularities of force authorizing statutes. Moreover, the percep-
tion surrounding the consummation of a declaration is one that includes an understanding 
of substantially greater longevity than accompanies typical authorizations throughout 
historical practice. 
 13. Professor Jack Goldsmith provides a compelling account of this period and the 
normative desirability of inter-branch communication and cooperation regardless of  
legal mandates:  
  The administration also eschewed genuine consultation with Congress, both 
formal and informal, with members of the President’s own party as well as 
members of the opposition. . . . The Bush administration’s failure to engage 
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military commissions, surveillance, and unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) strikes all represent issues in which detailed congressional 
involvement lagged initial policy action by the executive branch. As 
such, much of the framing (and democratic vetting) of post-
September 11 law relative to U.S. foreign policy was undertaken, 
Congressional action or input largely absent.14  
 Perhaps due to these dynamics, it has become fashionable to view 
Congress as a toothless, ceremonial stage prop whose role in U.S. for-
eign relations has been subjugated by an “Imperial Presidency” with 
ultimate authority reigning supreme within the realm of national 
security.15  
 The reality is much more complex. While congressional approval is 
rarely (if ever) a prerequisite for executive action in national security 
matters, it is always a booster for presidential authority. As a doctri-
nal matter, while the scope of independent presidential power in ini-
tiating hostilities is undefined, there is no doubt that presidential 
power can reach no higher than when exercised in accordance with 
the clearly articulated will of the legislature.16 As articulated by Jus-
tice Jackson in Youngstown, the President’s authority “is at its max-
imum” when he “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
of Congress.”17 In contrast, when the President engages in “measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his pow-
er is at its lowest ebb.”18 Within the political arena, the harmoniza-
tion of congressional and executive action grants a President far 
                                                                                                                                 
Congress eliminated the short-term discomforts of public debate, but at the ex-
pense of many medium-term mistakes. It also deprived the country of . . . na-
tional debates about the nature of the threat and the proper response that 
would have served an educative and legitimating function regardless of what 
emerged from the process. And it hurt the executive branch in dealing with the 
third branch of government as well. Courts have been much more skeptical of 
the President’s counterterrorism policies than they would have been had the 
President secured Congress’s and the country’s express support.  
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 206-07 (2007). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See, e.g., Glenn Sulmasy, Executive Power: The Last Thirty Years, 30 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 1355, 1355 (2009) (“The last thirty years have witnessed a continued growth in 
executive power—with virtually no check by the legislative branch. . . . [T]he bureaucratic 
inefficiencies of the Congress have crippled its ability to actually ‘check’ the executive, for 
fear of being perceived as ‘soft on terror’ or ‘weak on defense.’ ”). 
 16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). While the Youngstown paradigm unmistakably makes room for valid presi-
dential action with congressional silence and even opposition, express approval vastly im-
proves the likelihood that executive acts will be found constitutional. 
 17. Id. at 635. 
 18. Id. at 637. 
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greater flexibility in implementing policy than exists with a backdrop 
of legislative inaction, or worse, legislative contradiction.19 
A.   Constitutional Significance of AUMFs 
 The Constitution affords Congress and the President various pow-
ers at play in U.S. foreign relations. The extent to which these execu-
tive and congressional powers are exclusively vested in either branch, 
and the extent to which one branch can limit the other’s inde-
pendently held power, is constantly in debate.20 What cannot be de-
bated is that when the branches act in concert, the federal govern-
ment’s power is at its most potent and the validity of its actions are 
least questioned. As a constitutional matter, AUMFs operate square-
ly at this intersection of power, transforming executive acts from 
those that must be explained to ones for which no explanation  
is necessary.  
 Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown makes the 
determination of constitutional authority dependent upon determin-
ing the scope of authority granted to the President through congres-
sional authorization. Thus the legality of presidential action becomes 
a question of statutory interpretation: first of whether authorization 
exists and then of the scope of the authority granted.  
 Justice Jackson’s vision of executive power is fundamentally 
grounded in an institutionalist vision of the Constitution. 21  His 
framework for assessing the constitutionality of executive acts re-
flects the belief that the Constitution’s separation of powers regime 
distributes institutional competencies and advantages among the 
branches for which the act of governing would require the navigation 
and exposure to the institutionalist competencies present in each 
branch.22 In this view, both the executive and legislative branches 
possess institutional strengths that are complementary and function 
together interdependently. While the Executive is nimble and uni-
                                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 635-38. 
 20. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) (outlining controversy 
over the validity of congressional limitation of the commander-in-chief power throughout 
American history). The debate regarding the scope of the President’s independent ability to 
initiate hostilities is particularly heated and longstanding. However, the resolution to that 
question is not relevant here as, regardless of how one might plausibly answer that ques-
tion, there is no doubt that presidential powers are expanded when coupled with an au-
thorization for the use of force by Congress. 
 21. See Laura A. Cisneros, Youngstown Sheet to Boumediene: A Story of Judicial 
Ethos and the (Un)fastidious Use of Law, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 577, 586-92 (2012) (describing 
Youngstown and Jackson’s assessment of institutional competencies). 
 22. See Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 
263, 272-73 (2010) (discussing Youngstown and the institutional incentives created by the 
Jackson framework). 
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fied, the legislature is multitudinous and deliberative.23 When those 
institutional strengths align in determining a course of action, it is 
eminently sensible for the judiciary to offer a wide berth in gauging 
the legal appropriateness of governmental power.  
 The boundaries of statutory authority flow only from internal lim-
itations and the external boundaries set by hierarchically superior 
law.24 Under the models of statutory interpretation embraced by the 
judiciary, the meaning of any statute is fixed and unalterable from 
the time of its passage into law.25 The cornerstone of ascertaining this 
embedded meaning begins with the statute’s text. Only where the 
text is lacking is the jurist expected to move to secondary interpretive 
devices such as legislative history.26  
 As a practical matter, the doctrinal inflexibility of statutory im-
mutability is offset by the inherent pliability of judicial interpreta-
tion. While the text of law may be fixed,27 the meaning of that text 
often changes over time resulting in its expansion, contraction, or 
alterations to its character. As such, the judicial approach to statuto-
ry interpretation generally renders the immutable somewhat  
malleable.  
 AUMFs unwittingly usurp the institutional framework embedded 
in separation of powers and, as such, throw into doubt the accom-
plishment of the objectives the Jackson framework represents. Judi-
cial trepidation involving national security and the judicial doctrines 
erected from those fears compromise the flexibility statutory inter-
pretation typically adds. In fact, nothing within the current doctrine 
effectively explains the exceptionally rapid decay of authority that 
befalls congressional authorizations of the modern era. 
                                                                                                                                 
 23. See id. at 310, 313.  
 24. In this context, such “internal limitations” include not only the parameters of au-
thority set out by the text of an individual statute, but also the limitations existing within 
statutory law as a whole, which often carry provisions applicable to the understanding of 
other statutes.  
 25. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1479-80 (1987) (exploring frailties within the current paradigm of statutory interpre-
tation in which “approaches to statutory interpretation treat statutes as static texts”). 
 26. Even when those secondary mechanisms are invoked, it is in service to the propo-
sition of seeking the statute’s fixed meaning, or at least in service of the statute’s original 
purpose. 
 27. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
585, 618 (1996) (noting that both textualists and intentionalists view statutory authority 
as “fixed at the time of enactment”); Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 230 (1999) (“The decided trend has been toward the formalities 
of textualism and toward an understanding of statutes as static. On this view, judges are 
to say what statutes meant when enacted, and have always meant ever since.”). 
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B.   Statutory Significance of AUMFs 
 AUMFs automatically trigger the application of a variety of statu-
tory provisions with both domestic and international effect. 28 When 
declarations and force authorizations were considered as fulfilling 
separate purposes the differentiation in part reflected different statu-
tory results and differences in language. That is no longer the case. 
Contemporary AUMFs possess equivalent breadth of declarations, 
leading to the inevitable conclusion of interchangeability not just in 
international law but for domestic law as well.  
 Several statutes explicitly tie specific legal effects to the presence 
of a declaration of war or congressional authorization of force. For 
example, declarations enable the President to unilaterally implement 
trade restrictions,29 order the production of weaponry,30 seize tempo-
rary control of transportation instrumentalities, 31  extend military 
enlistment terms absent individual consent, 32  and expand intelli-
gence gathering absent specific court orders.33  
 AUMFs have also triggered the application of a variety of legal 
effects even in the absence of a formal instrument of law such as a 
declaration of war or a congressional force authorization. 34  These 
statutes impose new limitations or empowerments in administrative  
                                                                                                                                 
 28. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31133, 
DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2014); cf. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (“[C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the gen-
eral laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, 
so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.”). 
 29. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012). 
 30. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4517, 4531-4534 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-115 (ex-
cluding 114-95)). 
 31. See 10 U.S.C. § 2644 (2012) (authorizing assumption of control of transportation 
systems to transport troops, weapons, and other emergency materials).  
 32. See 10 U.S.C. § 519 (2012) (providing that “in time of war or of emergency declared 
by Congress” enlistments in armed forces are to be for duration of conflict plus six months); 
10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (2012) (providing that commissioned officers may not be dismissed 
from service “in time of war, [except] by order of the President”). 
 33. The Bush Administration asserted that the 9/11 AUMF authorized wiretaps with-
out judicial order without time limits. FISA was subsequently amended to authorize such 
investigative tools without a court order for foreign intelligence purposes in “emergency” 
circumstances as determined by the Attorney General. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2012) 
(noting that the President may authorize electronic surveillance of certain non-U.S. per-
sons without a court order for periods up to one year in specific circumstances). 
 34. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2012) (providing that “[a]ny person who in time of war is 
found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy” and compromising defense is to be tried by court-
martial and executed if convicted); 10 U.S.C. § 2663(a) (2012) (allowing seizure of land, 
either permanently or for temporary use, for military purposes including the production of 
munitions or to provide power necessary for the war effort “[i]n time of war or when war is 
imminent”); 10 U.S.C. § 3014(f) (2012) (lifting troop caps). 
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law,35 federal employment law,36 immigration,37 international trade,38 
energy regulation,39 criminal procedure,40 and even student financial 
assistance.41While these provisions don’t require an AUMF to be con-
sidered activated, operability is typically assumed when an AUMF is 
in force. 
C.   Declarative Significance of AUMFs 
 AUMFs are the tangible, legal, and sociological heirs to declara-
tions of war. A declaration of war is a paradigmatic example of tem-
porary legislating. Declarations represented notification of a shift in 
applicable law both internationally and domestically.42 The notifica-
tion was required because the laws to be applied were temporary ra-
ther than perpetual deviations from the governing rules that acted as 
the default. 43 
 At the time of the Founding, declarations of war served as a notifi-
cation to other states (neutral and belligerent alike) as to a change in 
the governing international legal paradigm from “peace” to “war,” 
and thus, the legal rules under which you intended to operate.44  
                                                                                                                                 
 35. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (excluding armed forces activity “exercised in the 
field in time of war” from administrative procedure requirements). 
 36. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5335(b) (2012) (pay increases); 5 U.S.C. § 8332(g) (2012)  
(retirement benefits). 
 37. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) (2012) (authorizing deportation to states other than 
the home country of the immigrant in question when the “United States is at war”).  
 38. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 95a (2012) (empowering President to regulate or prohibit any 
transactions involving foreign nations and foreign nationals “[d]uring the time of war”). 
 39. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2012) (allowing regulators to order energy facilities 
as to energy production and transmission “[d]uring the continuance of any war in which 
the United States is engaged”). 
 40. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2012) (suspending statute of limitations for prosecuting 
fraud perpetrated against U.S. government as well as other crimes against U.S. interests 
while the U.S. is “at war”). 
 41. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb (2012) (providing for waiver or modification of stu-
dent aid programs “in connection with a war or other military operation or national  
emergency”). 
 42.  See BRIEN HALLETT, THE LOST ART OF DECLARING WAR 84 (1998) (describing 
historical development and significance). 
 43. See David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International Law, 59 
WM. & MARY Q. 39, 46-47 (2002); Clyde Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Declara-
tion of War, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 19, 34 (1938) (advocating the use of war declarations in mod-
ern times); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration 
of War, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 114-15 (2008).  
 44. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2059. As historians have thoroughly doc-
umented, the phenomenon of “undeclared wars” has persisted throughout American histo-
ry. See, e.g., J.F. MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR: AN HISTORICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE CASES IN WHICH HOSTILITIES HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN CIVILIZED 
POWERS PRIOR TO DECLARATION OR WARNING: FROM 1700 TO 1870 (1883); W. TAYLOR 
REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS 
AND OLIVE BRANCH? 54-55 (1981); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other 
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 170-75 (1996). 
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 The global demise of war declarations primarily impacts their dis-
integrated efficacy within the international legal system.45 With the 
introduction of the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions, the 
international legal purpose of declarations has been displaced.46 In 
the post-World War II international legal system, the triggering ef-
fects once marked by formal recognition of conflict was displaced by 
the actual existence of an armed attack or use of force thus rendering 
a party’s refusal to recognize the conflict as immaterial to the legal 
questions at hand.47 
 However, domestic legal effects persist. Several statutory regimes 
are now directly linked to the existence of armed conflict or congres-
sional authorization. 48  During the course of various “undeclared” 
armed conflicts, the federal government has routinely invoked au-
thority and power, which, formally speaking, could only be activated 
following a formal war declaration.49  
 Further, declarations of war have always served functions and 
created effects far beyond their limited international legal purpose.50 
The demise of the legal instrument of declarations of war has only 
meant that these functions are fulfilled in the context of force author-
izations.51 While declaring war has withered as a legal concept, it has 
thrived as a sociological one. 52 Ironically, the death of formal declara-
                                                                                                                                 
 45. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2061 (noting that “the international law 
role for declarations of war has largely disappeared”); Prakash, supra note 43, at 128-30. 
 46. The UN Charter and Geneva Conventions represent the definitive death of the 
international legal purpose, one that had been suffering a slow decline over the course of 
centuries. See HALLETT, supra note 42, at 105-10. 
 47. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 19-20 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (show-
ing international law of war rules are not limited to “cases of declared war” but also apply 
to “any other armed conflict,” regardless of any states formally recognizing the existence of 
a “state of war”). 
 48. See, e.g., Paul D. Swanson, Limitless Limitations: How War Overwhelms Criminal 
Statutes of Limitations, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1564-65 (2012). 
 49. See generally Matthew C. Kirkham, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: A Check on Executive 
Authority in the War on Terror, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 707 (2007). 
 50. While declarations have faded as legal instruments, their expressive aims  
have not. 
 51. Throughout American history, declarations of war were never found alone, but 
rather always in the company of an authorization of force. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 12, at 2062. In tandem, declarations of war served an internal and external expressive 
function that has always been temporally limited. See id.   
 52. The rise described here is limited to informal declarations offered within the na-
tional security context, although the corresponding rise of “war” declarations on other so-
cial issues reflects policy makers understanding as to the sociological and rhetorical power 
of war declarations. While the wars on poverty and drugs are widely known, other “policy” 
wars legislators have invoked include a “war against rising health care costs,” 160 CONG. 
REC. E818 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of Rep. Fincher), a “war against the wage 
gap,” 160 CONG. REC. S2299 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2014) (statement of Sen. Mikulski), a “war 
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tions of war has coincided with the dramatic increase of informal dec-
larations within the national security realm.53 In recent years, gov-
ernment officials have stated that the United States is at war against 
terrorism,54 “Islamic fascists,”55 Al Qaida, Al Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula, ISIL, terrorism, and Muammar Qadhafi, 56 among others. 
Internally, declarations are decisional vehicles in which the justifica-
tion and aims of armed conflict are articulated and specified. As a 
matter of domestic legal process, that means that declarations pro-
vide the framework for public understanding as to the limits of the 
conflict in which the United States is entering.  
 The academic consensus that formal declarations of war are im-
material to contemporary conflict and that statutory authorizations 
have taken their place is unmistakably correct.57 But from that con-
clusion, the notion that the underlying purposes of declarations are 
extinguished does not follow. Contemporary AUMFs have carried 
forward much of the domestic legal implications that once flowed 
from declarations of war. While formal declarations were always ac-
companied by authorizations of force, the instruments have merged 
to form the instrument of contemporary AUMFs.  
III.   THE FOUNDATIONS OF FORCE AUTHORIZATION DECAY 
 Given the temporally limited nature of declarations throughout 
U.S. history, contemporary AUMFs should be read similarly. They 
serve as the formal congressional means sufficient (in some circum-
                                                                                                                                 
against cancer,” 160 CONG. REC. H4014 (daily ed. May 8, 2014) (statement of Rep. Lance), 
a “war against sex trafficking,” 160 CONG. REC. H4510 (daily ed. May 20, 2014) (statement 
of Rep. Scott).  
 53. In the first half of the twentieth century, there exist few, if any, Western leaders 
referring to “war” as anything other than the existence of actual legally declared conflict or 
internal civil wars (for which a declaration would be irrelevant). 
 54. Also called the Global War on Terror (GWOT), “war on terror,” “war against global 
terrorism,” etc. 
 55. 152 CONG. REC. S9073 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bunning). Un-
der this umbrella also falls invoked wars against “Islamic fundamentalism,” “violent radi-
cal Islamists,” and “radical Islam.” 160 CONG. REC. H3358 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2014) (state-
ment of Rep. Gohmert) (“radical Islam”); 160 CONG. REC. S128 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2014) 
(statement of Sen. Toomey) (“violent radical Islamists”).  
 56. 160 CONG. REC. E850 (daily ed. May 28, 2014) (statement of Rep. Foxx) (against al 
Qaeda); 160 CONG. REC. H1237 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 2014) (statement of Rep. Gohmert) 
(Qadhafi); 148 CONG. REC. S4287 (daily ed. May 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson); 
Barry Wigmore, This War with the ‘Fascists of Islam’, by Bush, DAILY MAIL (last updated 
Aug. 11, 2006), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-400009/This-war-fascists-Islam-
Bush.html (showing President Bush stating that a foiled hijacking plot was “a stark re-
minder that the U.S. is ‘at war with Islamic fascists’ ”). 
 57. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 2057 (“[A] declaration of war is not 
required in order for Congress to provide its full authorization for the President to prose-
cute a war. An authorization of military force can be sufficient and, in fact, may even  
be necessary.”). 
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stances required) for authorizing the use of force. They bring into 
force emergency provisions designed for applicability during wartime.  
 The novel characteristics of post-9/11 armed conflict have spurred 
tremendous consternation regarding the dynamics of war generally 
and the scope of authority under the 9/11 AUMF. At the highest level 
of generality, the question pitched is when will the 9/11 AUMF cease 
to be operative due to the conclusion of the conflict? Does the with-
drawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan impose repatriation obliga-
tions of current detainees only alleged to have allied themselves with 
the Taliban rather than al Qaeda? 
 Relatedly, commentators are inquiring as to whether the 9/11 
AUMF includes an authorization by the President to use military 
force for the purposes of combating terrorism more generally.58 Most 
urgently, this question has arisen relative to an unfolding bombing 
campaign targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).59 
Regardless of outcome, this analysis is always anchored to traditional 
models of statutory interpretation, assessing the text, the intentions 
of the legislature, and ultimately the policy implications of varying 
conclusions.60  
A.   Authorization Decay in Practice  
 The theoretical underpinnings of AUMF decay are matched by the 
reality of such decay. Under traditional models of statutory interpre-
tation, these authorizations remain valid until repeal. In fact, some 
are repealed. But while repeal is unusual, ultimate inoperability is 
the norm.  
                                                                                                                                 
 58. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L 
SECURITY J. 115, 119 (2014) (arguing that “calls for a new framework statute to replace the 
AUMF are unnecessary, provocative, and counterproductive; they perpetuate war at a time 
when we should be seeking to end it”). 
 59.  See, e.g., William S. Castle, The Argument for a New and Flexible Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 510-31 (2015). Alternatively, 
ISIL is self-described as “The Islamic State” and typically described by media outlets as the 
“Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). See, e.g., What Is ‘Islamic State’?, BBC (Dec. 2, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144. ISIL appears to be the pre-
ferred terminology of U.S. government officials—the relevant actors for this Article. 
 60. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve ISIS Strikes, 
but Says It Isn’t Necessary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/09/11/world/middleeast/white-house-invites-congress-to-approve-isis-strikes-but-says-
it-isnt-necessary.html?_r=0 (discussing 9/11 coverage and noting a Middle East specialist 
from the Brookings Institution saying, “The Islamic State was an Al Qaeda affiliate, and it 
is not anymore. So technically, the A.U.M.F., as I understand it, would 
not cover the Islamic State.”); Paul Waldman, Will Lawmakers Really Leave Town Without 
Voting on War?, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
plum-line/wp/2014/09/17/will-lawmakers-really-leave-town-without-voting-on-war/ (exam-
ining possible coverage of 9/11 AUMF and 2002 Iraq AUMF for the purpose of authorizing 
force against ISIL). 
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 1.   Executive Recognition of Decay 
 As the Soviet Union was mired in conflict in Afghanistan during 
the 1980s, the American people would likely have been tremendously 
surprised to learn that Congress had fully authorized President 
Reagan to intervene with military force “in the general area of the 
Middle East” to combat “international communism.”61 After the de-
ployment of ground troops to Afghanistan, the public would likely 
have also been puzzled by President Reagan’s subsequent speech an-
nouncing his expansion of the conflict into Cuba and how these ac-
tions had also been fully authorized by Congress in a wholly separate 
authorization which embraced the use of force against Cuba’s  
communist regime.62 
 Less whimsically, in 2002, one would have forgiven the Bush Ad-
ministration if it had vigorously asserted that it already possessed 
any requisite congressional authorization for an invasion of Iraq. In 
1991, Congress authorized President George H.W. Bush “to use Unit-
ed States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 678.”63 After all, the United States’ use of force in 1991 
ended with a cease-fire agreement, the terms of which Iraq had re-
peatedly violated over the decade that followed, much to the chagrin 
of U.S. officials.64 But neither the White House nor Congress made 
this argument as a matter of domestic law. 65 Forgoing this argument 
was especially odd given that the White House aggressively pursued 
a nearly identical argument66—specifically, that the AUMF issued 
                                                                                                                                 
 61. Joint Resolution of Mar. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-7, § 2, 71 Stat. 5, 5 (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 1962 (2012)) (“[I]f the President determines the necessity thereof, the United 
States is prepared to use armed forces . . . .”). 
 62. Joint Resolution of Oct. 3, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697, 697 (committing 
to ensure the preventing expansion of communist influence by “whatever means may be 
necessary, including the use of arms”). 
 63. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-
1, 105 Stat. 3, 3 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)). The UN Security Council 
Resolution referenced had been approved toward the conclusion of the year prior. S.C. Res. 
678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
 64. See Colin Warbrick & Dominic McGoldrick, The Use of Force Against Iraq, 52 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 811, 811-12 (2003). 
 65. That is not to say that scholars and commentators never mentioned this position 
as a possibility, only that it was never actively embraced as a strategy to justify force.  
 66. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America, Letter dated Mar. 20, 2003 from 
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the President of the Security Coun-
cil, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003) (“The actions being taken are authorized under 
existing Council resolutions . . .”); see also Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 338, 338-41 (Mar. 17, 2003) (“Under Resolutions 678 and 687, both still 
in effect, the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of 
weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority. It is a question of will.”); 
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 (Resumption 1) (Mar. 27, 
2003) (showing statement of U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N. Security Council). 
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prior to the 1991 Gulf War provided the President with authorization 
for invading Iraq—before the U.N. Security Council.67  
 Why do Presidents so often decline to rely upon applicable existing 
force authorizations?68 The arguments in favor of such reliance as a 
legal matter are straightforward. First, the textual foundation for the 
above presidential claims is strong, if not dispositive. That textual 
foundation coupled with judicial canons of deference to the Executive 
in matters of foreign affairs presents a formidable claim.69 Despite 
this, it is unquestionable that President Reagan’s reliance on the 
1957 Middle East Resolution and the 1962 Cuba Resolution would be 
rejected out of hand. While more compelling, President Bush’s deci-
sion to eschew reliance on the 1991 Gulf War Authorization would 
roundly be questioned, just as his Administration’s identical argu-
ment to the United Nations was poorly received.70  
 Part of the answer likely involves political calculations, although 
not in the democratic accountability sense.71 But the “political re-
straint” answer is, at best, incomplete. Democratic accountability  
is typically referred to as a political constraint on executive action  
in the electoral sense.72 In most circumstances, however, armed con-
flict, especially at the beginning stages, only makes a President more 
politically powerful, not less. Whatever constraint electoral account-
ability exerts on a President disintegrates fully in a second term 
when the President is no longer eligible for re-election. Presidents  
are likely circumspect regarding force authorizations, insofar as such 
authorizations present meaningful political risk in accomplishing 
other objectives should they fail to pass Congress. Having said that, 
there is good reason to believe that the communicative power of  
the presidency provides a sufficient platform by which, in most cir-
                                                                                                                                 
 67. Professor Sean Murphy provides a highly illuminating and detailed assessment of 
this argument as a matter of international law. See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality 
of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004). 
 68. Professor Stephen Griffin has recently provided an excellent examination of the 
existing conflict against non-state actors through the perspective of the indefinite nature of 
the Cold War. See generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2013). 
 69. See Daniel J. Freeman, Note, The Canons of War, 117 YALE L.J. 280 (2007) (de-
scribing applicable canons of interpretation relevant to armed conflict); see also Ingrid 
Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming 
Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 324-32 (2005) (discussing the text and legislative history 
of the AUMF at issue in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld). 
 70. See Murphy, supra note 67, at 175-76; A. Mark Weisburd, The War in Iraq and the 
Dilemma of Controlling the International Use of Force, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 521, 529-30 
(2004) (examining the Bush Administration’s argument put before the United Nations). 
 71. See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 52-55 (2013) 
(describing the host of difficulties in attaching democratic accountability to executive 
branch actions). 
 72. Id. at 55.  
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cumstances, the President would be able to secure a congressional  
authorization without expending a prohibitive amount of political 
capital. 
 It also appears likely that presidential hesitancy in relying on ag-
ing authorizations reflects the reasonable belief that to do so would, 
at best, be viewed as legally questionable by the courts.73  
 2.   The Invisible Doctrine of Decay 
 Formally, the judiciary’s approach to force authorizations reflects 
the standard text-based model.74 In practice, however, the limited 
body of cases addressing issues as to national security generally and 
force authorization in particular appear hopelessly inconsistent. De-
spite its incoherency, the judiciary has definitively embraced the self-
expiring nature of force authorizations and, more haphazardly, re-
flected an increasing skepticism as to the potency of force authoriza-
tions with age—in short, an implicit acknowledgement of AUMF  
decay.  
 a.   The Failure of Classic Text-Driven Interpretation 
 Questions of statutory interpretation are generally limited to a 
single layer—the meaning and scope of the statute being interpreted. 
In contrast, force authorizations serve as the hub of an enormous 
constellation of regulations laws.75 As such, decisions as to the validi-
ty and scope of AUMFs ripple widely through the governing law of 
the United States.76  
                                                                                                                                 
 73. See United States v. Pfluger, 685 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that while 
the 1991 Gulf War has not concluded according to the government, that “[w]e admit that it 
would seem suspect if the Government had tried to indict Pfluger solely based on the sus-
pension of limitations triggered by that conflict”). 
 74. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559 (2006) (“[T]here is nothing in the 
AUMF’s text or legislative history even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter 
the . . . UCMJ.”); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (relying on 
“plain and unambiguous terms” of the AUMF); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. 
Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 715 (6th Cir. 2007) (interpreting the AUMF language relative to 
FISA requirements). 
 75. Several of these laws are set out above. See supra notes 29-32, 34-41. The Con-
gressional Research Service has produced a comprehensive list of laws activated by 
AUMFs, declarations of war, and declarations of emergency. ELSEA & WEED, supra note 28, 
at 1-17. 
 76. At its extreme, the executive branch has not rejected the notion that force  
authorizations (in particular the 9/11 AUMF) represent sufficient authority for the use of 
force against U.S. citizens within the territorial boundaries of the United States. See  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A  
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED 
FORCE, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
The 9/11 AUMF has likewise been asserted as a triggering justification for domestic 
electronic surveillance set out under other statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). 
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 Even more atypically, AUMFs play a central role in contemplating 
governmental power as a constitutional matter. Jackson’s vision of 
executive power as articulated in Youngstown makes assessing con-
stitutionality of executive action dependent upon determining the 
scope of authority granted to the President through congressional 
authorization—a question of statutory interpretation.77  
 Statutory interpretation is driven by text.78 Only where the text  
is lacking is the jurist expected to move to secondary interpretive de-
vices such as legislative history.79 The judiciary’s articulation of the 
governing standard in interpreting force authorizations has been no 
different.80  
 A commitment to text-driven interpretation by the judiciary 
means, at least theoretically, the meaning of any statute is fixed from 
the time of its passage into law.81 If the text dictates the scope of au-
thority of the statute, then that authority cannot change absent a 
change to the statute’s text.82 Instead, the contours of statutory au-
thority flow only from internal limitations and the external bounda-
ries set by hierarchically superior law.83  
                                                                                                                                 
 77. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
 78. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1509, 1556-57 (1998) (showing “[a]ll major theories of statutory interpretation consider the 
statutory text primary,” and under all such theories “there must be a compelling reason to 
derogate” from such text); Gary Lawson, Optimal Specificity in the Law of Separation of 
Powers: The Numerous Clauses Principle, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 42-43 (2011) (“[M]odern 
methods of statutory interpretation center primarily on textual analysis.”). 
 79. Even when those secondary mechanisms are invoked, it is in service to the propo-
sition of seeking the statute’s fixed meaning, or at least in service of the statute’s original 
purpose. See Eskridge, supra note 78, at 1520-21. 
 80. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Con-
temporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 216-22 (2011) (discussing text-based interpretations of the AUMF 
used by courts examining legality of detention practices). 
 81. See Eskridge, supra note 25, at 1479-80 (1987) (exploring frailties within current 
paradigm of statutory interpretation in which “approaches to statutory interpretation treat 
statutes as static texts”). 
 82. To be clear, a statute can contain text that is self-limiting through the expression 
of an implicit conditional termination or an explicit specific temporal limitation (such as a 
sunset provision). Such limitations are largely inapplicable in the AUMF context. The 1983 
Lebanon AUMF contains both explicit-specific and conditional-temporal limitations. In 
that AUMF, Congress’s authorization expired at “the end of the eighteen-month period” 
from enactment. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 6, 97 
Stat. 805, 807 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)). However, the authorization 
would expire prior to the passage of eighteen months if (1) other allied foreign forces with-
drew; or (2) the United Nations or Government of Lebanon assumed responsibilities of the 
Multinational Force; or (3) other “effective security arrangements” were implemented; or 
(4) all other countries withdrew from participation in the Multinational Force. Id.  
 83. In this context, such “internal limitations” include not only the parameters of au-
thority set out by the text of an individual statute, but also the limitations existing within 
statutory law as a whole which often carry provisions applicable to the understanding of 
other statutes.  
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 Generally, the doctrinal inflexibility of statutes as immutable in-
struments of authority is offset by the inherent pliability of judicial 
interpretation.84 While the text of law may be fixed, the meaning of 
that text often changes over time, resulting in the expansion, con-
traction, or alteration of the nature or scope of authority of the stat-
ute in question.85  
 Under normal circumstances, a text-driven view of statutory im-
mutability incentivizes several positive legislative behaviors. Under-
standing statutory authority as timeless rewards careful draftsman-
ship and avoids the difficulties (both political and resource-related) 
that accrue from being forced to revisit past legislation due to unfore-
seen or unintended consequences.86 
 Requiring active legislative action to change the scope or authority 
of past law might also combat responsibility shifting. In theory, 
where statutory authority is immutable, legislators cannot effectively 
blame other institutions for the breadth and scope of the statute in 
question.87 After all, the legislature is both where the statute was 
born, and the only entity empowered to oversee its death absent Con-
stitution-based infirmities.  
 Unfortunately, this delicate dance performs poorly when applied 
to AUMFs. Existing doctrine leads courts to avoid cases in which 
they might have to engage in limited interpretation or, worse, invoke 
deference doctrines that would fundamentally compromise the court’s 
statutory interpretation rules generally.88  
 When it comes to questions of foreign affairs generally and na-
tional security in particular, the judiciary is very hesitant to inter-
pret law in a manner contrary to that advocated by the executive 
branch.89 As an initial barrier, justiciability doctrines, such as invoca-
                                                                                                                                 
 84. See Peter L. Strauss, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and Administered Law, 20 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1, 14 (1994) (“Treating statutes as static events, forever fixed in 
meaning at the time of their enactment, can be disruptive even in the context of the com-
mon law, where the courts are directly responsible for change.”). 
 85. The limited bandwidth of such change is inherent to text-based interpretation as 
well as its primary competitor, “intentionalism.” See Madeline June Kass, A Least Bad 
Approach for Interpreting ESA Stealth Provisions, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
427, 433 (2008) (noting that by “focusing on the particular intent of the enacting legisla-
ture, the interpreter fixes statutory interpretation to a single moment in history”). 
 86. The inverse is also true. Statutory immutability punishes poor draftsmanship, 
perhaps excessively.  
 87. See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 317, 343 (2005) (stating that when the judiciary interprets the meaning of 
the statute, “ ‘congressional incentive theory’ assumes that Congress will act because Con-
gress knows that change can only come from it”). 
 88. See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1361 (2009).  
 89. Id. 
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tion of the political question doctrine, successfully keep many cases 
posing national security questions from ever reaching a decision on 
the merits.90  
 When cases make it beyond the justiciability stage, the court has 
the option of applying a variety of deference doctrines. These doc-
trines counsel for deference both as to the executive branch’s favored 
interpretations of law, but also as to the facts it proffers supporting 
its position.91  
 Whenever a court utilizes a deference doctrine, it activates two 
layers of judicial withdrawal. When the deference is absolute, the ju-
diciary simply does not review the underlying question.92 In relative 
deference, where the deference is to take the shape of a non-definitive 
“weight,” deference possesses the power to transform a losing legal 
argument into a winning one.93 Under either approach, deferring to 
the interpretations of law offered by the executive branch necessarily 
requires the adoption of interpretations of law that, but for the desire 
to defer to the Executive, would be rejected.94 Deference to the Execu-
tive is even stronger within the factual context, an area where courts 
feel especially ill-suited to compete against the executive branch’s 
capacities, especially as to issues of armed conflict.95 
                                                                                                                                 
 90. The political question doctrine, essentially a dead-letter doctrine as to domestic 
issues, is the center of nonjusticiability in foreign relations cases. See, e.g., Rachel E. Bar-
kow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of 
Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 273-317 (2002) (detailing the fall of the polit-
ical question doctrine in domestic-oriented cases); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some 
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Centu-
ry, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2308 (2002) (observing that “[t]he decline of the political ques-
tion doctrine . . . has been pervasive in all kinds of cases”). 
 91. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1363 (2009) (concluding that “many arguments in favor of deference are unpersuasive, but 
that deference nonetheless may be justified in limited circumstances”). 
 92. See PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 444 (4th ed. 1998) (“Though successful resort to the politi-
cal question doctrine in purely domestic disputes is unusual, the doctrine appears to have 
greater vitality in foreign affairs.”). 
 93. For example, it is longstanding doctrine that the judiciary affords the executive 
branch “great weight” in interpreting treaties. See Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty 
Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 790 n.70 (2008). The degree to which such deference is 
actually accomplished is debatable, but the judicial norm as to the applicability of weighted 
deference doctrines is clear. See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign 
Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 103 (2009) (noting that “whether ‘great weight’ 
deference is meaningful or just a cover, it does reveal that courts view treaties as requiring 
at least the appearance of exceptional deference”). 
 94. See Knowles, supra note 93, at 99 (“When courts defer to the executive branch’s 
interpretation of the law, they cede some or all of [their power to define the meaning  
of law].”). 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(stating that the President “has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war”). 
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 Collectively, these specialty doctrines reflect a view both of judi-
cial insecurity and political branch superiority.96 Such doctrines of 
purported judicial humility purport to reflect deference to the “politi-
cal branches” thus implying an equal deferential purpose in favor of 
both Congress and the Executive when finding nonjusticiability.97 
This is not at all the case. With the withdrawal of judicial interac-
tion, the only interpretation that matters is that of the executive 
branch, the only branch of government empowered to execute the law 
that the judiciary has declined to interpret. In contrast, Congress, 
whose very structure is designed for the slow machinations of delib-
eration, is left only with the implausible, theoretical possibility of an 
untimely repeal.98  
 Even if, against the weight of institutional design, Congress acted 
quickly to repeal an active force authorization, the legal effects would 
be highly circumscribed. 99 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is the only 
force authorization to be repealed while armed conflict continued.100 
Despite its repeal, there was little, if any, legal effect on the Presi-
dent’s ability to continue the conflict.101 Likewise, judicial decisions 
                                                                                                                                 
 96. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 953, 1015 (1994); Jason Marisam, Constitutional Self-Interpretation, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
293, 315 (2014) (“Presidents are most likely to receive absolute or strong judicial deference 
in foreign affairs and national security cases . . . .”).  
 97. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The funda-
mental division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges 
from overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; 
these matters are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”). 
 98. While the possibility of repeal of any legislation is not “theoretical,” the history of 
such efforts strongly reinforces the notion that such repeal is unlikely. There were, for 
example, a number of attempts to pass legislation explicitly limiting or repealing the 2002 
Iraq authorization; none of which were successful. From the 110th Congress alone, there 
were eight pieces of legislation with such aims. See H.R. 1460, 110th Cong. (2007) (for re-
peal of 2002 Iraq AUMF); S. 679, 110th Cong. (2007) (declaring that the objectives of 2002 
Iraq AUMF had been achieved and establishing new authorization before redeploying 
troops); S.J. Res. 3, 110th Cong. (2007) (establishing expiration); S. 670, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(requiring new military authorization unless conditions met); H.R. 930, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(repeal 2002 Iraq AUMF); H.R. 508, 110th Cong. (2007) (same); H.R. 413, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (same). 
 99. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Mean-
ing, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1291-92 (2006) (“[J]udgments of nonjusticiability . . . tend to 
conjoin reasoning that emphasizes judicial incompetence with suggestions that the disputed 
questions are assigned to other branches.”). 
 100. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (repealed 1971). 
In 1974, Congress also repealed the 1955 authorization for the President to use force to 
protect Taiwan, but this repeal did not occur in the midst of armed conflict. State Depart-
ment/USIA Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-475, § 3, 88 Stat. 1439 
(1974) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. at 624).  
 101. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 
(1971); John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitu-
tionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 905-08 (1990) (discussing 
the repeal and noting that the “movement for repeal was born of a desire to end the war” 
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found that the domestic laws triggered initially by the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution remained in force despite its appeal, in large part based 
on their deference to the President’s assertion that the U.S. remained 
“at war” for purposes of the statutory regimes in question.102 
 The judiciary’s commitment to text-based interpretation, com-
bined with its deference to executive legal interpretations and fact 
proffers, means that existing doctrine currently reflects a design that 
concretizes poorly justified executive branch legal interpretations in-
to operative precedent. 103  A text-reliant approach to interpreting 
AUMFs cements the flawed processes that characterize the birth of 
force authorizations into a state of permanency and severely com-
promises the ability of the judicial and legislative branches to counter 
executive branch overreach.104  
 b.   Provisionality and Shifting Functionalism  
 Given the advantages held by the Executive, any attempts to limit 
the scope and authority of force authorizations, either substantively 
or temporally, following their passage seem destined to fail. But the 
reality is that the courts somewhat regularly deviate from the estab-
lished script, circumscribing presidential power in declared or au-
thorized war as the underlying campaign continues.  
 The Court’s jurisprudence reflects the understanding that the jus-
tification and authorization of armed conflict must be understood as 
temporary, and likewise, lays a foundation for a functionalist shift 
that coincides as armed conflict authorization wanes.  
 These two norms can be identified as reflecting a view of AUMF 
decay. The first resolves a necessary precursor to AUMF decay— 
that force authorizations expire without any internally embedded 
restriction requiring such expiration. The second indicates a func-
tionalist interpretation model in which the focus of the “function” 
driving interpretation shifts from conflict functionalism to democratic 
functionalism. 
 Recognizing the decay of force authorizations begins with embrac-
ing a notion upon which decay is premised—that neither war, nor the  
                                                                                                                                 
but that by the time of repeal, Congress had “pointedly reiterated its authorization of the 
war” in appropriations legislation). 
 102. See Ely, supra note 101, at 905-06. 
 103. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 780 (“[D]eference is the ceding of one power in favor 
of another.”). 
 104. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (documenting the “triumph of ‘executive discretion’ in 
the constitutional regime of foreign relations”). 
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enlarged emergency power that accompanies it, can be perpetual in 
nature.105 The embedded temporariness of AUMFs has been recog-
nized repeatedly.  
 The provisional nature of expanded presidential authority was a 
theme of the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the application of 
military commissions to a suspected Confederate sympathizer in Ex 
parte Milligan.106 In Milligan, the Court held that expanded wartime 
powers were not perpetual and that their life is dependent upon the 
circumstances that gave them birth.107 In its opinion, the Court re-
peatedly refers to the fact that the Civil War had recently conclud-
ed.108 While it’s true that the Civil War had concluded at the time of 
the Court’s opinion, strictly speaking, that would have been irrele-
vant for assessing Milligan’s case. The Court did not assert that Mil-
ligan’s circumstances had changed with the conclusion of the conflict, 
but rather that the commission he was subjected to was unlawful at 
the time it occurred, several months prior to the conclusion of the 
conflict.109  
 Instead, it seems that the significance of the conclusion of the war 
is a functional one. Whereas, “at the beginning” when the Confeder-
ates had “seized almost half the territory, and more than half the  
resources of the government,” functionalism demands “that martial 
law may prevail, so that the civil law may again live.”110 During this 
time, “the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in deliber-
ation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely 
                                                                                                                                 
 105. Professor Stephen Vladeck articulates the quandary as such:  
[I]f the fight against terrorists truly is a ‘war’ for constitutional purpos-
es, as the Supreme Court has now effectively held it to be, then what is 
the impact on the President’s war powers—those extreme prerogatives 
that the Constitution (or Congress) only authorizes the Executive to ex-
ercise during times of war?  
Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War With-
out End, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 54 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 56-
59 (proposing sunset provisions as part of AUMF enactment). 
 106. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (“As necessity creates the 
rule, so it limits its duration.”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. passim. The Court’s most frequent reference is to the “late Rebellion,” but in 
the alternative, it frames the question relative to the “late war” and “late troubles” as well.  
 109. Id. at 6 (Milligan “was arrested on the 5th day of October, 1864” and put on trial 
before a military commission on “the 21st day of the same month”). The conclusion of the 
Civil War is generally considered to have happened with the surrender of the Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee on April 9, 1865, though fighting did not cease for several months. 
The Confederate President Jefferson Davis declared the rebellion over on May 9, 1865, and 
the last of the Civil War hostilities occurred during June or July of 1865 as word filtered to 
the various Confederate units. See BUD HANNINGS, EVERY DAY OF THE CIVIL WAR: A 
CHRONOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 525, 534-35 (2010). 
 110. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 106. 
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judicial question.”111 The gradual conclusion of the conflict gives rise  
to an opportunity for the Court to formally invalidate law that, in 
prior years, it would have been unable to invalidate due to the func-
tional demands of conflict. In so doing, the Court expresses a view of 
itself as reinvigorating the democratic and liberty-respecting values 
for which the Civil War was fought. 112  In short, when the Court 
opines that the American people “insist only that the Constitution be 
interpreted so as to save the nation, and not to let it perish,” it refers 
to security in the sense of both physical safety and safeguarding 
democratic values.113  
 This shift from “conflict functionalism” to “democratic functional-
ism” is replicated in other conflicts. Many of the cases decided during 
the World War II era are understood as exhibiting the height of def-
erence to the executive branch and being exceptionally restrictive of 
civil liberties.114 However, even within this universe of cases, a shift 
from conflict to democratic functionalism is evident: a shift that 
matches a more optimistic prognosis for the Allies’ fulfillment of ob-
jectives for the war than existed at the time Hirabayashi was decided 
eighteen months prior.115 
 The shift is most clear, although permeated with ambivalence, 
among the Supreme Court’s considerations of the imposition of spe-
cial rules, including internment, on Japanese-Americans during the 
war.116 The Court’s first opinion on the subject, issued on June 21, 
1943, rejected a challenge by a Japanese-American university stu-
dent convicted of violating curfew and relocation orders in California 
in Hirabayashi v. United States.117 Justice Stone, writing for the ma-
jority, made clear that conflict functionalism would be the deciding 
                                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 109. 
 112. Margaret A. Garvin, Civil Liberties During War: History’s Institutional Lessons, 
16 CONST. COMMENT. 691, 706 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS 
BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998) which cites Milligan as reflecting the Court’s 
pattern of seizing opportunity for “reinvigoration of civil liberties”). 
 113. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 104. 
 114. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 
U.S. 1 (1942).  
 115. By the time of the Court’s decisions in Endo and Korematsu, the Allies had en-
tered Rome, Paris had been liberated from the Nazis, and large numbers of Axis power 
troops were surrendering as the Allies entered Germany. See William J. Meade, Book Re-
view, 84 MASS. L. REV. 47, 52 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS 
BUT ONE, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)) (noting that between the major Japanese 
internment cases, “[w]hat became evident was that as the United States’ prosecution of the 
war grew increasingly successful between the time of the Hirabayashi and Endo decisions, 
so did the laws become less silent”). 
 116. See generally Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 
(2003) (offering a detailed examination of Supreme Court decisions regarding Japanese 
internment during the Second World War). 
 117. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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factor in the case. The opinion unapologetically embraces an inter-
pretive framework of the war power with its functional ends, stating 
that “[t]he war power of the national government is ‘the power to 
wage war successfully.’ ”118 As such, once in motion, that power “ex-
tends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially 
to affect its conduct and progress.”119 Notably, there is no allegation 
or evidence of disloyalty on behalf of Hirabayashi individually. While 
the majority finds the question of individualized disloyalty of no mo-
ment, Justice Douglas’s concurrence suggests that the racial distinc-
tion is valid because the costs associated with individualized process 
were, presumably, prohibitively high.120  
 On December 18, 1944, the Court issues two more Japanese in-
ternment cases, Ex parte Endo121 and Korematsu v. United States.122 
While the cases are fundamentally in tension, both illustrate that the 
emphasis has shifted toward democratic functionalism.123 While ac-
knowledging the broad powers of the government in war present in 
Hirabayashi, the opinion in Endo contextualizes the legality of this 
power relative to other guarantees as “the Constitution is as specific 
in its enumeration of many of the civil rights of the individual as it is 
in its enumeration of the powers of his government.”124 The Court 
goes on to order Endo’s release because, absent individualized evi-
dence of disloyalty, her detention was not necessary in protecting the 
nation and promoting the war effort.125  
 Even Korematsu, which upholds internment in circumstances 
highly similar to that of Endo, frames its decision within rights-
protective terms. Contrary to the language of Hirabayashi, the  
Korematsu opinion acknowledges that “all legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately  
suspect” and that “courts must subject them to the most rigid scruti-
ny,” thus first articulating the components of strict scrutiny judicial  
review.126 
                                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 93. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“But where the peril is great and the time is 
short, temporary treatment on a group basis may be the only practicable expedient what-
ever the ultimate percentage of those who are detained for cause. . . . To say that the mili-
tary in such cases should take the time to weed out the loyal from the others would be to 
assume that the nation could afford to have them take the time to do it.”). 
 121. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 122. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 123. See id. at 223-24; Endo, 323 U.S. at 294-307. 
 124. Endo, 323 U.S. at 299. 
 125. Id. at 294-307. 
 126. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.  
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 During the Vietnam era, a number of lawsuits were filed by mem-
bers of the military challenging the legality of the use of force in  
Vietnam.127 In the years immediately following the 1964 authoriza-
tion of the conflict, the courts repeatedly refused to address the mer-
its of these cases in unequivocal terms. In February of 1967, the D.C. 
Circuit dismissed one such case stating that the grounds for dismis-
sal “are so clear that no discussion or citation of authority is need-
ed.”128 The opinion made clear that the courts had no role in these 
cases because “the use and disposition of military power . . . are 
plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”129 
 By June of 1970, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals initially held 
that these same challenges were justiciable but then remanded the 
case, notifying both parties that the challengers would need to show 
that “congressional debates and actions, from the Gulf of Tonkin Res-
olution through the events of the subsequent six years,” were insuffi-
cient in authorizing the President’s acts in Vietnam.130 A year later, 
the case returned to the Second Circuit as Orlando v. Laird.131 The 
conventional legacy of Orlando is that the case stands for the propo-
sition that Congress’s approval of force need not be limited to 
AUMFs, but can also be inferred from congressional appropriations 
funding the war effort.132  
 Taken at a slightly higher level of abstraction, however, the Or-
lando court is engaged in a tentative form of democratic functionali-
ty. The court doesn’t find the authorization of the continuing conflict 
in Vietnam within a single piece of legislation, but in multiple signif-
icant statutes that the court reasonably finds as representing the 
                                                                                                                                 
 127. These challenges tended to focus on the absence of a formal declaration of war, but 
in other circumstances, specific regulatory challenges were made as well. 
 128. Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curium). Similar 
cases had nearly identical holdings. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (per curiam). 
 129. Luftig, 373 F.2d at 666. 
 130. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 131. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 132. See David A. Simon, Ending Perpetual War? Constitutional War Termination 
Powers and the Conflict Against Al Qaeda, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 739-47 (2014) (discussing 
authorization of conflict via appropriations power). The War Powers Resolution, passed in 
1973, explicitly demands that the judiciary not interpret appropriations legislation as suf-
ficient authorization. It is unclear whether or not this provision would be respected or is 
consistent with constitutional demands. See Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John 
Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1399 (1994) (arguing that this provision is unconstitutional and 
should be disregarded); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in Na-
tional-Security Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1059, 1078-88 (2009) (countering constitutionality ar-
guments levied on War Powers Resolution in this respect).  
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political branches’ “mutual and joint action in the prosecution and 
support of military operations in Southeast Asia from the beginning 
of those operations.”133 
 3.   Decay in Contemporary Conflict 
 One could argue that material differences exist in contemporary 
conflict, such as that enshrined in the 9/11 AUMF, that renders these 
historical practices inapplicable. After all, past conflicts were under-
taken against state powers with which a definitive conclusion to the 
conflict could be consummated. In fact, nowhere is an unarticulated 
understanding of AUMF decay more prominent than within the “War 
on Terror” context.  
 Within days of the September 11 attacks, Congress authorized the 
President to:  
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.134 
 The 9/11 AUMF is broadly articulated. It places no limitation on 
the means and methods of force to be used by the President, instead 
enabling the President to determine himself what force is “necessary 
and appropriate.”135 It imposes no reporting requirement for the ex-
ecutive branch to fulfill or outline any geographic limitation as to the 
President’s use of force in pursuit of those specified.136  
 Finally, the 9/11 AUMF contains no temporal limitation, automat-
ic sunset provision, or timetable for revisitation. As such, as a statu-
tory matter, the degree of authority granted to the President through 
the 9/11 AUMF should be fixed throughout time; thus any act within 
the authorization provided by Congress in 2002 would still be author-
ized in 2012 or 2052.137  
 The reality has been quite different. In the decade that followed, 
the Supreme Court has slowly tightened authorities flowing from the 
                                                                                                                                 
 133. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042. 
 134. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)).  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. At least absent another act of Congress that undermines the original authority as 
to the 9/11 AUMF. The most straightforward manner of alteration would be through a 
subsequent act of Congress that directly amends or repeals the original statute. A change 
in the authorization’s authority could also come through a separate statutory regime. 
There are a multitude of canons of construction applicable in such circumstances (which 
often suggest opposing conclusions).  
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9/11 AUMF, repeatedly emphasizing democratic functions and the 
relevance of changing circumstances. 
 In June of 2004, the Court issued an opinion in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, a case challenging the President’s detention powers.138 
Hamdi, a United States citizen, was detained as an “enemy combat-
ant” after having been captured in Afghanistan and entering the cus-
tody of U.S. forces.139 As a threshold question, Hamdi challenged the 
President’s authority to detain those it designated as “enemy com-
batants” under the 9/11 AUMF.140 Not only was the text of the 9/11 
AUMF silent as to the existence of any detention authority, but there 
also existed other statutory law that precludes the detention of any 
U.S. citizen absent a specific statutory authorization issued by Con-
gress.141 Next, if the President does possess the relevant detention 
authority, what process was Hamdi owed (and thus that the Execu-
tive was required to satisfy) for his continued detention to be legally 
valid?142  
 The resolution of these questions squarely challenged the Court to 
assess whether Congress had authorized the President’s acts. 
Hamdi’s argument as to the threshold detention question was simple: 
the President did not possess the authority to detain him because 
Congress had already spoken as to the detention of U.S. citizens dur-
ing war-time and affirmatively prohibited the practice, absent specif-
ic congressional legislation, through the “Non-Detention Act.”143 Fur-
ther, the passage of the Non-Detention Act was designed precisely  
for the purpose of avoiding the replication of the unsubstantiated 
“emergency” detention of citizens that occurred during World War 
II.144 Put within the familiar framework of Justice Jackson’s Youngs-
town opinion, this was a Category 3 case, as the President was en-
gaged in “measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will 
of Congress . . . .”145 
                                                                                                                                 
 138. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 139. Id. at 510 (according to the Court, Hamdi was “seized by members of the Northern 
Alliance . . . and eventually was turned over to the United States military”). 
 140. Id. at 510-11. 
 141. Id. at 510-11, 540-41. 
 142. Obviously, the 9/11 AUMF does not speak to this issue either.  
 143. Under the Non-Detention Act, Congress mandated that “[n]o citizen shall be im-
prisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Con-
gress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012). 
 144. Specifically, the internment of Japanese-Americans whom the government 
deemed a threat due to a presumption of continued loyalty to Japan, an American enemy. 
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (“The concentration camp implications of the legislation render 
it abhorrent.”) (citations omitted).  
 145. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
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 In response, the Government asserted that the 9/11 AUMF, de-
spite being silent with respect to any detention power of citizens or 
non-citizens, represented Congress’s authorization of the President’s 
acts.146 Using the parlance of Youngstown, the existence of the AUMF 
meant that this was a Category 1 case, in which the President’s acts 
were “pursuant to” the authorization of Congress, not in contraven-
tion of it. 
 On the threshold question, a plurality of the Court concluded that, 
despite the silence of the 9/11 AUMF, “[b]ecause detention to prevent 
a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of 
waging war, . . . Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized 
detention . . . .”147 As for the process to which Hamdi was due for his 
detention to be justified under the AUMF, the Court struck a cau-
tious but deferential tone. The plurality held that Hamdi is due no-
tice and an “opportunity to rebut,” which he can exercise in a “mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner.”148 The Court continued to 
suggest that a “knowledgeable affiant” could provide a summary of 
“documentation regarding battlefield detainees . . . kept in the ordi-
nary course of military affairs” and that such information would be 
sufficient evidence for detention so long as the individual was provid-
ed the opportunity to respond.149  
 The marginal process and broad authorization articulated in 
Hamdi shifted four years later in the Court’s decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush.150 After Hamdi, the government erected substantial struc-
tures to comport with the procedural requirements the Court had dic-
tated.151 In many ways, the procedural guarantees offered through 
these new processes extended meaningfully beyond the bare bones 
process that the plurality suggested was sufficient. Despite this, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 146. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.  
 147. Id. at 519-21 (referencing “individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban com-
batants who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ ”). 
 148. Id. at 533, 538 (citation omitted). 
 149. Id. at 534; see also Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Conver-
gence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008) (discussing 
criminal and military detention models). 
 150. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 151. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The 
Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 40-47 (2008) (examining the Supreme Court’s 
analogy to Article 5 tribunals in Hamdi and the process established by the government 
thereafter). The establishment of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, Annual Review 
Boards, and other procedural rules were issued approximately two weeks after the Hamdi 
decision. Id. at 6. 
2015]  INTERPRETING FORCE AUTHORIZATION 269 
 
Court struck down this system in 2008. In so doing, the Court was 
silent as to its typical deference doctrines and unmistakable in its 
concern regarding executive abuse of power.152 
B.   Institutional Deficiencies in Authorizing Force 
 The Youngstown framework, in which constitutional questions 
hinge upon congressional authorization, reflects a belief that such a 
framework maximizes the value of the differing institutional ad-
vantages of the political branches.153 Specifically, it recognizes that 
both the executive and legislative branch possess institutional 
strengths and interdependency. While the Executive is nimble and 
unified, the legislature is multitudinous and deliberative.154 When 
those institutional strengths align, it is eminently sensible for the 
judiciary to offer a wide berth in gauging the legal appropriateness of 
governmental power. AUMFs upset these presumptions and, as such, 
throw into doubt the basic wisdom of the approach the Jackson 
framework represents.  
 The traits of force authorizations deviate tremendously from those 
of typical federal legislation. Time and information afforded to Con-
gress for deliberative process, in particular, is greatly reduced when 
force authorizations are considered. 
 Most statutes only pass through Congress following an almost 
painfully slow process of marinating, deliberating, and extensive lob-
bying of relevant interests. Force authorizations are passed in the 
relative blink of an eye.  
 Most legislation is passed seeking to negate the harms produced 
through underlying realities. Force authorizations are intended to 
change the underlying observable realities that give birth to them.  
                                                                                                                                 
 152. Cf. Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security and the Ad-
ministrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1955-61 (2012) (describing Boumediene as ex-
pressing a lack of deference to the Executive as to constitutional questions, and Hamdan as 
a lack of deference in treaty interpretation matters); Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Defer-
ence: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 
806 n.118 (2011) (“One most easily reads Justice Kennedy [in Boumediene] as understand-
ing the deference obligation to go to Congress and the President—not to the executive 
alone.”).  
 153. This institutionalist view is foundational to separation of powers doctrine. See 
Randy J. Kozel, Institutional Autonomy and Constitutional Structure, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
957, 964 (2014) (describing the separation of powers and federalism envisioned by the 
founders as one of “[s]tructural institutionalism”). 
 154. See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 269 (2006) (“Structural advantages of the President over Congress—
such as the capacity to act unilaterally and poor congressional incentives to monitor expan-
sions of presidential power—provide grounds to embrace such constraints on executive 
power.”); cf. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive 
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 835 (2013). 
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 Most statutes are designed as part of an interdependent and in-
terrelated regime of legal treatment as to their legal targets or the 
subject matter being regulated. In contrast, force authorizations 
largely stand as an island—independent, or at least non-reliant on 
related legislation.  
 Of all seven authorizations passed by Congress, only the 1983 au-
thorization in Lebanon and the 1991 Gulf War authorization gener-
ated any significant opposition.155 However, even including the much 
slimmer than usual margin of these two AUMFs, the average vote 
margin remains breathtaking, with an average 82-13 vote count in 
the Senate and 343-77 vote count in the House of Representatives.156 
 The speed and margin of these post-World War II authorizations 
strongly suggests that Congress’s institutional role as the slow, de-
liberative actor among the political branches has been compromised. 
Further reinforcing the perception of non-deliberation is the relative 
lack of amendments and the brevity characteristic of these AUMFs.  
                                                                                                                                 
 155. See Actions Overview: S.J. Res. 159—98th Congress (1983-1984), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/159/actions (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016); Actions Overview: H.J. Res. 77—102nd Congress (1991-1992), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-joint-resolution/77/actions (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016); see also Charles M. Madigan, To Americans, Trumpet’s Call Uncertain, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Jan. 13, 1991) (discussing ambivalence of public and “significant opposition” to 
U.S. force against Iraq). Both the 1983 (Lebanon) and 1991 (Iraq) circumstances were unu-
sual in the sense that most of the troop deployments in theater occurred far before congres-
sional authorization was contemplated or requested. See Associated Press, U.S. Troops Not 
Ready, General Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 20, 1990, at A1, 1990 WLNR 
624838 (noting that in the first Gulf War more than 400,000 troops had been deployed as 
part of Desert Shield before congressional authorization in January 1991). The Lebanon 
authorization is particularly anomalous. There, the congressional authorization not only 
substantially lagged the deployment of significant numbers of troops, but only came about 
following a separate congressional resolution explicitly requiring statutory authorization 
for any act that resulted in the material enlargement of the number of troops deployed in 
the operation. See Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-43, § 4(a), 97 
Stat. 214, 215 (1983).  
 156. See Actions Overview: S.J.Res.23—107th Congress (2001-2002), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/23/actions (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016); Actions Overview: H.J.Res.114—107th Congress (2001-2002), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-resolution/114/actions (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016); Actions Overview: H.J. Res. 77—102nd Congress (1991-1992), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-joint-resolution/77/actions (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016); Actions Overview: S.J.Res.159—98th Congress (1983-1984), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/159/actions (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016) (a Senate vote count of 100-0 was used to calculate the average because the 
website indicated the Senate vote was “unanimous”); H.J.Res. 1145 (88th): Joint Resolution 
to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/88/hjres1145 (last visited Feb. 27, 
2016); H.J.Res. 117 (85th): Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle 
East, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/85/hjres117 (last visited Feb. 27, 
2016); H.J.Res. 159 (84th): Joint Resolution Authorizing the President to Employ the Armed 
Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores and Relat-
ed Positions and Territories of That Area, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/84/hjres159 (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
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 These differences matter. The peculiarities of force authorizations 
forces Congress to operate in a manner in which many of its institu-
tional strengths are compromised and its weaknesses pronounced. 
Treating AUMFs identically to routine appropriations legislation ig-
nores the variation of importance and democratic functionalism un-
derlying force authorizations and foregoes an opportunity for more 
nuanced understanding for judicial action.  
 1.   Time 
 Typical federal law enacted in typical circumstances is the product 
of a multi-year dialogue between the executive and legislative 
branches.157 This process, in which the deliberative and divided bat-
tleship of Congress dances with the unified machinery of the execu-
tive branch, has been described as a “signature feature of the consti-
tutional separation of powers [due to] its tendency to foster special 
qualities associated with good governance, such as deliberation, en-
ergy, steady administration, and judgment.”158  
 There can be little doubt that the normal framework of inter-
branch dialogue and deliberation is fundamentally upended when 
Congress is asked to authorize a President’s use of force. While the 
Executive acts with “unity, force, and dispatch,” Congress emphasiz-
es “debate and consensus among large numbers.”159 
 American presidents have sought congressional authorization for 
the use of force six times since the conclusion of World War II.160 In 
the 1950s, President Eisenhower twice sought congressional authori-
zation for the use of force, once as to Taiwan and once as to the Mid-
dle East. Both were justified as necessary as part of the larger Cold 
War effort against communism.161 President Johnson sought and re-
                                                                                                                                 
 157. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 180-81 (1994) (describing the deliberative process 
over any non-routine legislative matter as creating interbranch dialogue extending over 
“several, even many, Congresses”). 
 158. Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation 
of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003). 
 159. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 27 (2010). 
 160. Congress has actually authorized force seven times during this era, excluded with-
in this discussion is a congressional authorization of force as to Lebanon during the Reagan 
Administration. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 
805 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)). This is excluded because, unlike the 
other force authorizations, President Reagan never formally or informally sought an au-
thorization for the use of force. 
 161. Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Meth-
odology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 869-70 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL 
WAR POWER (1995)) (“When the Chinese Communists threatened Formosa in 1955, Eisen-
hower sought authorization from Congress for possible U.S. military action. He likewise 
sought a resolution in 1957 in response to communist threats in the Middle East.”). The 
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ceived authorization for conducting hostilities in the Vietnam War 
through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.162 In recent decades, in addi-
tion to the 9/11 Authorization, Congress passed two other authoriza-
tions for the use of force in Iraq in 1991 and 2002.163 Congress re-
sponded to all six requests by passing legislation authorizing force. In 
four of the six instances, Congress introduced and passed an AUMF 
through both houses in less than a week.164  
 Such speed is anathema to the deliberative process, but it also is 
considered a requirement for legislators contemplating AUMF pas-
sage.165 During debate over the 9/11 AUMF, Congressman Ron Paul 
stated, “The complexity of the issue, the vagueness of the enemy, and 
the political pressure to respond immediately limits our choices. The 
proposed resolution is the only option we are offered, and doing noth-
ing is unthinkable.”166  
 Even without additional complications, the quality of decisions is 
compromised when acting under time-sensitive conditions. 167  This 
phenomenon is easily identified individually, but recent evidence 
strongly suggests that the cognitive impairments faced by individuals 
attach equally to institutions.168  
                                                                                                                                 
Formosa Resolution authorized the President “to employ the Armed Forces of the United 
States as he deems necessary” in defense of Formosa (Taiwan). Joint Resolution of Jan. 29, 
1955, ch. 4, 69 Stat. 7, 7. The 1957 Middle East resolution stated that “if the President 
determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces” to 
assist Middle Eastern nations “against armed aggression from any country controlled by 
international communism.” 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (originally enacted as Joint Resolution 
of Mar. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-7, § 2, 71 Stat. 5). 
 162. Bobbitt, supra note 132, at 1392 (stating that Johnson had sought an AUMF from 
Congress so there “could be no doubt” as to the legality of his Vietnam policy). 
 163. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)); Authorization for 
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 3 (1991) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)). 
 164. See 116 Stat. 1498; Joint Resolution of Mar. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-7, 71 Stat. 5 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012)). 
 165. Carla Crandall, Comment, Comparative Institutional Analysis and Detainee Legal 
Policies: Democracy as a Friction, Not a Fiction, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1339, 1355 (2010) (not-
ing speed of AUMF passage). 
 166. 147 CONG. REC. 17,112 (2001) (statement of Rep. Paul). 
 167. See Cleotilde Gonzalez, Learning to Make Decisions in Dynamic Environments: 
Effects of Time Constraints and Cognitive Abilities, 46 HUM. FACTORS 449, 450 (2004) (find-
ing that “time constraints have a negative effect on the ability of individuals to make deci-
sions effectively”).  
 168. See ERIC K. STERN, CRISIS DECISIONMAKING: A COGNITIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACH (2003); Paula Posas & Thomas Fischer, Organisational Behaviour and Public 
Decision Making in the EA Context, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LECTURERS’ 
HANDBOOK 96, 104-11 (Thomas Fischer et al. eds., 2008), http://www.twoeam-eu.net/ 
handbook/03.pdf. 
2015]  INTERPRETING FORCE AUTHORIZATION 273 
 
 2.   Information  
 The problems inherent as to short timelines are exacerbated by 
informational deficiencies particular to Congress’s consideration of 
force authorizations. This need to act quickly is combined with multi-
fold informational deficiencies. First, the presence of a short deci-
sional timeline dramatically limits the amount of time Congress pos-
sesses to gather information that could be useful in its consideration 
of authorizing force.169 The institutional architecture of Congress is 
built for long-range information gathering in which congressional 
members and their staff acquire information from various sources 
(including NGOs, constituents, competing political lobbying groups, 
etc.) as to the underlying facts relevant to potential legal rules. The 
circumstances in which force authorizations arise, however, leave 
Congress reliant upon information from the Executive.170  
 The executive branch, understandably self-interested in the out-
come of any congressional authorization, uses its informational ad-
vantages by controlling what information is provided, shaping how 
that information is provided, and deciding when that information is 
provided relative to a force authorization measure’s introduction. 
 The facts surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution ably demon-
strate all three of these concerns.171 As hostilities escalated in Vi-
etnam over 1963, President Johnson had determined he would seek 
an AUMF but did not want the issue to further complicate his domes-
tic legislative agenda including the Civil Rights Bill.172 While confi-
dent that an authorization would be forthcoming, seeking the author-
ization absent an identifiable act of provocation would require a sub-
                                                                                                                                 
 169. During the debate of the 9/11 AUMF, Representative Jackson shared the thoughts 
of a fellow Member who had expressed that “she had been in Congress for 19 years, but 
never had been asked to make a decision and cast a vote with so little information.” 147 
CONG. REC. 17,148 (2001) (statement of Rep. Jackson).  
 170. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 942 (1994) (characterizing the “the flow of na-
tional security information” to Congress as “constricted by the need for secrecy and so de-
pendent on the self-interested discretion of executive officials”); Ryan M. Scoville, Legisla-
tive Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. REV. 331, 386 (2013) (discussing legislative fact-finding and 
that congressional reliance on information from the Executive can “interfere with the allo-
cation of legislative power to Congress”). 
 171. See Michael Mandel, Note, A License to Kill: America’s Balance of War Powers and 
the Flaws of the War Powers Resolution, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 785, 787-88 
(2009) (“The short period of time between the attack and the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution allowed little time for debate or independent investigation by Congress, and as 
such, Congress relied upon the information provided by the executive branch . . . .”). 
 172. See Gary R. Hess, Authorizing War: Congressional Resolutions and Presidential 
Leadership, 1955-2002, in DIVIDED POWER: THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND THE 
FORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 39, 52 (Donald R. Kelley ed., 2005).  
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stantial amount of political capital.173  When reports came in of a 
North Vietnam attack of U.S. military vessels the amount of political 
capital required to secure Congress’s authorization to respond was 
dramatically reduced.174 
 On August 4, 1964, President Johnson reported that the North 
Vietnamese had launched two attacks on U.S. ships “on the high seas 
in the Gulf of Tonkin.”175 According to the Johnson Administration, 
on August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats had fired on the 
U.S.S. Maddox, which sparked an exchange of fire and the sinking  
of a handful of North Korean vessels. Two days later, the Maddox  
reported another attack to which several aircraft were launched in  
response. Armed with a compelling narrative, President Johnson 
seized the opportunity to justify seeking a congressional force author-
ization that, in turn, offered him a much freer hand in prosecuting 
the escalating conflict.176 
 The facts surrounding the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin remain 
in dispute.177 Ultimately, the truth of the facts as to what occurred in 
the Gulf of Tonkin is not relevant for this Article; however, the pres-
ence of the debate as to the accuracy of those facts exemplifies the 
problem of Congress’s informational reliance on the executive branch. 
When the Executive is the primary (or sole) source of information, 
Congress is reliant on the information the President provides. 178 This 
reliance both renders the Executive vulnerable to arguments that 
                                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. (stating that Johnson believed “[c]onvincing congressional leaders of the need 
for the resolution would take much time unless, as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
remarked on June 10, ‘the enemy acts suddenly in the area’ ”). 
 174. See id. at 52-54. 
 175. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Radio and Television Report to the American Peo-
ple Following Renewed Aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin (Aug. 4, 1964), in 2 PUB. PAPERS 
927 (1965). 
 176. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Af-
fects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2005) (explaining the crisis theory 
and the suggestion “that the Constitution demands judicial deference to the Executive and 
the legislature during times of international crisis”). 
 177. Many investigative reports and scholars put forth evidence that the attack de-
scribed by the Johnson Administration never occurred or, at the least, was dramatically 
exaggerated for political purposes, while others plainly assert that the Johnson Admin-
istration’s account was if not entirely accurate, entirely truthful. Compare, e.g., Robert 
Bejesky, Precedent Supporting the Constitutionality of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Reso-
lution, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) (“The Vietnam War launched after an alleged 
attack in the Gulf of Tonkin that never occurred. The Johnson Administration conveyed 
false information to Congress and the American public.”), with Bobbitt, supra note 132, at 
1394 (stating that deception by the Johnson Administration “is frequently, and falsely, 
alleged about the Gulf of Tonkin incidents”). 
 178. See J. William Fulbright, Congress, the President and the War Power, 25 ARK. L. 
REV. 71, 79 (1971) (“As the lawyers say, ‘Partial truth is an evasion of truth.’ There is no 
better example of the Congress acting with haste and with insufficient or inaccurate infor-
mation than the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964.”). 
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they intentionally misled Congress as to the facts and calls into ques-
tion the legality of the actions promulgated pursuant to the authori-
zation in question.179  
 3.   Deference 
 The error costs associated with these information deficiencies per-
sist beyond the passage of any particular AUMF. These information-
al deficiencies are most acute at the time AUMFs are first consid-
ered, but the information asymmetry between the branches impedes 
Congress’s ability to monitor their authorization of force after pas-
sage as well. As a general matter, once an AUMF is passed Congress 
is able to diversify its information sources and begin to digest contra-
dictions. The fact remains, however, that the executive branch will 
remain the primary source of information both to the public and to 
legislators, ill-equipped to effectively monitor the effects and effec-
tiveness of the force they have authorized. 
 A hallmark of deliberative lawmaking is its collective draftsman-
ship. Federal legislation is rarely sponsored by a single member.180 
Final statutory language always reflects the input of tens to hun-
dreds of individuals. Again, the history of force authorizations re-
flects a much different reality. 
 The prevalence of amendments is a strong signaling device of 
properly functioning legislative deliberation. None of the seven post-
World War II authorizations passed by Congress were amended as 
part of Congress’s deliberation.  
 If the absence of successful amendments is unsurprising, the near 
total absence of proposed amendments is troubling.181 Most legisla-
                                                                                                                                 
 179. As articulated by one scholar, “It is an open constitutional question whether even 
a specific statutory authorization would be valid if it were based on deception.” See Bobbit, 
supra note 132, at 1394 (“Thus, constitutional argument from an ethical perspective re-
quires that the public be fully and truthfully informed of the war aims of the President. If 
the People were deceived in the process, no customary method of taking the United States 
to war would be legitimate.”). 
 180. A study of all legislation introduced between 1973 and 2004 found that the aver-
age number of sponsors for federal legislation was over 8.5. See James H. Fowler, Connect-
ing the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 456, 459 (2006) 
(showing that the Library of Congress’s “Thomas” legislative database “includes more than 
280,000 pieces of legislation proposed . . . with over 2.1 million co-sponsorship signatures”). 
 181. The 2002 Iraq AUMF, in which Congress had the most time, saw two substantive 
amendments proposed. Both of the failed amendments invoked United Nations Security 
Council Action, either generally resolving that the President should seek U.N. Security 
Council authorization or making Congress’s authorization contingent upon a like-minded 
Security Council authorization. Compare H. Amendment 609, 107th Cong. (2002) (noting 
that this amendment would have made the U.N. Security Council Authorization a prereq-
uisite for U.S, action, but it failed 155-270), with H. Amendment 608, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(attempting to resolve that the U.S. should seek resolution by the U.N. Security Council, 
but the amendment failed 72-335). 
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tive amendments do not represent an attempt to alter the underlying 
legislation, but instead serve as a mechanism of expression. Expres-
sively, proposing amendments are frequently used to highlight a line 
of division between the political parties or serve as backdrop for fu-
ture legislation to which the amendment relates.182  
 Perhaps the absence of amendments flows naturally from a lack of 
text to amend—another area in which force authorizations diverge 
from typical legislation. Political science research demonstrates that 
“the number of words in the legislation is a good measure of the 
amount of policy discretion” that will be seized by the Executive.183 
This research suggests that a proliferation of words corresponds with 
the amount of deliberation by Congress and the level of precision 
drawn by the statute as to the authority set out in the relevant legis-
lation.184  In other words, much like the Constitution, when fewer 
words are present, there is an expectation that substantial ambiguity 
will remain. The understanding of the presence of ambiguity is cou-
pled with an understanding that such ambiguities will be resolved.185 
 Recent analysis of federal statutes suggests that the “average” 
statute possesses more than 90,000 words.186 In contrast, the average 
contemporary AUMF consists of 427 words.187 This relative dearth of 
guidance inverts the historical norm in which declarations were 
“lengthier and more complex than many eighteenth-century stat-
utes.”188 There are many possible explanations as to the brevity of 
force authorizations.189 But those explanations do not change the fact 
                                                                                                                                 
 182. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 251 (14th ed. 2014). 
 183. John D. Huber et al., Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy, 45 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 330, 337 (2001). If nature abhors a vacuum in space, government abhors a vacu-
um of power. See id.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Resolved by someone or some entity (as opposed to lying fallow and inoperative). 
 186. Kirk A. Randazzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of Congressional 
Statutes on Judicial Behavior, 68 J. POL. 1006, 1011 n.16 (2006) (“[T]he mean number of 
words per statute equals 94,122 with a standard deviation of 107,238.”).  
 187. This constitutes less than one-half of one percent of the average statute (.49%). Of 
these seven AUMFs, five have less than 270 words. The 2002 Iraq AUMF and the 1983 
Lebanon AUMF are the two longest authorizations at 591 and 1373 words respectively. 
 188. Prakash, supra note 43, at 119 (“Declarations reached this length precisely be-
cause they served so many different purposes. As we have seen, declarations were used not 
only to start a war, but also to provide notice of a forthcoming or ongoing war, to lay down 
conditions for peace, to propagandize, and to create wartime legal rules for citizens, enemy 
nationals, and neutrals.”). 
 189. It is likely that even with full congressional deliberation, the text of force authori-
zations would never approach the statutory average. The level of precision necessary to 
engage in effective regulation in most areas undoubtedly drives much of the text in domes-
tic legislation. This is not to say that the use of force should be viewed as a simple binary 
calculation, but more that the degree of precision typically appropriate (or demanded) in 
other legislation is not present in the force authorization context. In this vein, members of 
Congress might, quite appropriately, understand that changing circumstances justify a 
substantial degree of baked-in discretion to the President. Whatever these explanations 
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that such brevity lends itself to a broad transference of authority 
away from Congress and that this transference is accompanied by the 
careful deliberation that the legislative process is designed to effec-
tuate. In this case, the outlier effectively proves the rule. Congress’s 
1983 Lebanon AUMF is, by far the longest AUMF of the post-war era 
at 1,373 words. The facts surrounding the Lebanon AUMF are 
unique. Congress faced no time pressure in considering an AUMF for 
Lebanon because substantial numbers of U.S. troops had already 
been deployed and were already filling combat roles.190 Absent time 
pressure, Congress was able to more effectively gather information 
and contemplate its desired course of action. Finally, unlike the other 
post-World War II era AUMFs, President Reagan did not dictate 
when Congress would consider the authorization. Its consideration 
was a product of congressional prerogative rather than presidential fiat. 
 4.   Specified Objectives 
 Congress’s consideration of legislation typically focuses on the fu-
ture, rather than the past. Federal statutes typically seek to amelio-
rate the effects of generalized, intractable problems.191 By contrast, 
force authorizations are sparked by specific, identifiable facts, and 
changing those identifiable facts is the entire purpose of Congress in 
authorizing force.  
 By definition, intractable problems possess a persistency and sys-
temic embeddedness that make them highly resistant to resolution.192 
The quality and depth of such resistance is highly variable and tends 
to reflect the peculiarities of the regulated subject matter. For in-
stance, the persistence of problems the government seeks to address 
                                                                                                                                 
are, they cannot be boiled down to the substantive demands (or lack thereof) of military 
force.  
 190. Deployment of troops as part of the Multinational Force in Lebanon began in 
1982. John H. Kelly, Chapter 6: Lebanon 1982-1984, RAND CORP., http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129-chapter6.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). Congres-
sional authorization in October of 1983 was for the “continued” U.S. participation in the 
operation. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 
(1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)); see Curtis Wilkie, Reagan: Marines to 
Stay Until Israel, Syria Leave, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 29, 1982) (discussing the deployment 
of U.S. troops to the area). 
 191. Immutability is certainly not the only factor at play here. The influential strength 
of statutory immutability directly correlates with the transaction and opportunity costs 
associated with passing legislation in the first instance. In a world in which such costs are 
very low, the immutable authority and scope of a statute is inconsequential because the 
alteration or repeal of that statute is equally costless. Of course, where transaction and 
opportunity costs are high, immutability becomes an almost insurmountable burden.  
 192. See Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Proposi-
tions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1439, 1447-48 (1992) (defining indeterminacy); William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress 
Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 177-83 (2000). 
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in drafting rules for financial markets fundamentally reflects the 
disagreement among experts in identifying the core factors causing 
the ills legislators are seeking to avoid.193 
 In other circumstances, many of the acts that give rise to societal 
problems may not, in and of themselves, be independently recognized 
as problematic. This quandary underlies much of the debate within 
health care reform. Specifically, while there is consensus that the ris-
ing costs of the health care system are unsustainable, there is also 
consensus that doctors should not be impeded in exhausting all ave-
nues in treating patients, the cost of which is a direct contributor to 
the collective expense problem. 
 Regardless of the cause of a problem’s persistence, most legislative 
efforts are intended to provide immediately applicable solutions, for 
which the indefinite continuation is understood. Not only is the 
steady continuation of a statute envisioned at its inception, the error 
costs associated with failure are likely to be insignificant. While it is 
true that few statutes reach the lofty goals envisioned at the time of 
their passage, a statutory regime cannot fairly be considered a true 
failure unless it is responsible for the harms meaningfully beyond 
those it intended to alleviate.194  
 The specificity of the facts giving rise to force authorizations, and 
thus responsible for the existence of AUMFs, fundamentally under-
cuts an understanding of AUMFs as possessing static, perpetual 
power through the passage of time.195 Force authorizations are the 
product of identifiable facts, and the changing of those facts is their 
entire reason for being.196 As such, regardless of text, their scope can 
only be understood relative to the alteration of the facts that gave 
them birth. 
                                                                                                                                 
 193. See Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1294-98 (1994) (discussing the framing of problems for legislative 
attention and legislative responses). 
 194. The harms created must be “meaningfully” above those at the time of origin due to 
the value of experimentation implicitly embedded in the attempt at resolving the harm in 
the first instance. 
 195. See Craig W. Dallon, Interpreting Statutes Faithfully—Not Dynamically, 1991 
BYU L. REV. 1353 (1991) (arguing against deviations from textualist interpretive models); 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1463-65 (2000) (discussing force of context in interpreting congres-
sional action); Steven D. Smith, Correspondence, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 
105 (1989).  
 196. Congress has never authorized the use of force (or declared war) without 
knowledge of (a) the identity of the enemy, (b) the facts sparking the AUMF, and (c) an 
answer as to what the immediate aims of the use of force are. See Matthew C. Waxman, 
The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 429, 
437-38 (2010) (suggesting that the primary debate does not concern the readily identifiable 
answers to these questions, but what conditions are sufficient to give rise to use of force 
authorities).  
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 Specificity in declarations of war and AUMFs may not only be a 
matter of historical practice, but also constitutionally required. Con-
gress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 seeking to avoid the 
creeping conflict escalation that characterized Vietnam.197 The Reso-
lution, among other things, authorized the President to deploy U.S. 
troops for sixty days before requiring specific congressional  
approval.198 One of the primary constitutional attacks levied against 
the Resolution was that it pre-authorized (and pre-limited) the use of 
force without specifying as to the circumstances giving rise to the au-
thorization, the parties to which the force was targeted, and the aims 
for which the force was to be applied.199  
 This specificity and purpose is uniformly manifest in contempo-
rary AUMFs. The specific facts underlying the use of force differ, but 
they are always identifiable and Congress’s authorization of force is 
based on the alteration of those facts. For example, Congress’s 1955 
AUMF, with respect to Formosa, found that “certain territories in the 
West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now 
under armed attack, and . . . the Chinese Communists [have de-
clared] that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for 
armed attack on Formosa.”200 In response, the President is authorized 
to use force for “the specific purpose of securing and protecting For-
mosa, and the Pescadores against armed attack.”201 
 The planned obsolescence of Congress’s authorization of force is  
an AUMF prerequisite. While it is fundamentally normal for most 
                                                                                                                                 
 197. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Af-
fairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1260 (1988) (detailing a variety 
of military actions usurping the War Powers Resolution, including “the creeping escalation 
it was expressly designed to control”). 
 198.  50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012) (enabling the President to unilaterally extend a dead-
line an additional thirty days upon a determination and certification to Congress “that 
unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces re-
quires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt 
removal of such forces”); § 1547(a)(1) (prohibiting implicit authorization and requiring a 
force authorization statute that “specifically authorizes . . . hostilities . . . and states that it 
is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this  
chapter”). 
 199. See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the 
United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 671 n.365 (1993) (noting constitutional problems with 
“an arrangement under which Congress pre-authorizes the use of force without specifying 
the particular conflict or the specific party against whom the troops would be used”). See 
generally J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991) (discussing the consti-
tutional and definitional difficulties associated with the “ex ante” determination of “war” 
required by the War Powers Resolution).  
 200. Joint Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-4, 69 Stat. 7, 7 (reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. app. at 12,269 (1970)) (repealed 1974). 
 201. Id.  
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legislation to alleviate harm, an authorization of force with the belief 
that changing the facts giving rise to that authorization is impossible 
would be the height of foolishness. 
 If Congress understands the force authorizations it provides as 
temporally finite, why do these authorizations so infrequently make 
the demise of authorizations explicit? Because understanding some-
thing will occur is not the same as understanding when that thing 
will occur. 
C.   Recognizing Four Phases of AUMF Decay 
 Instead of interpreting AUMFs as an emergency frozen in time, a 
proper interpretation of force authorizations can only occur with the 
understanding that as time passes, facts inevitably change, institu-
tionally compromising urgency subsides, and democratic values 
counsel renewed attention. What is required is an approach to AUMF 
interpretation that emphasizes the distinct phases of force authoriza-
tion, beginning with a potent functionalist approach and concluding 
with total inoperability.  
 1.   Textless Conflict Functionalism 
 This functionalist perspective on the scope of authorization is not 
limited to the judiciary; it is also typically shared by those in Con-
gress.202 During the discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, one 
Senator commented that under the Resolution the President is not 
“limited in regard to the sending of ground forces.”203 Likewise, Sena-
tor John S. Cooper commented that the Resolution gives “the Presi-
dent advance authority to take whatever action he may deem neces-
sary respecting South Vietnam and its defense.”204 
 This basic functionalist interpretation does not limit the Executive 
in action so long as the acts possess a colorable tie to advancing  
U.S. interests in the armed conflict in question.205 While acts during 
this phase are almost never considered invalid, they do impose 
                                                                                                                                 
 202. As well as, unsurprisingly, officials within the executive branch. 
 203. 110 CONG. REC. 18,427 (1964) (statement of Sen. Morse). 
 204. 110 CONG. REC. 18,409 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cooper).  
 205. This is not to suggest the impossibility of any finding of invalid executive action 
during the first phase of authorization, only that such a finding would necessarily involve 
(1) a very substantial violation of other existing statutory law; (2) in which the acts in 
question the judicial actor finds insubstantial (or at least largely irrelevant) to the U.S. war 
effort. Neither element would independently suffice and the presence of the latter compo-
nent is exceptionally unlikely during this phase, a period of time in which the judiciary 
would find itself particularly insecure as to its grasp of the various factual dimensions at 
play relative to the armed conflict. See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515 
(D. Mass. 1968) (stating that “in the Vietnam situation a declaration of war would produce 
consequences which no court can fully anticipate”). 
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marginal executive-constraining effects. Perhaps the most significant 
of these effects is the creation of a basic burden of production and  
explanation.206  
 2.   Text-Based Executive Constraint 
 As an AUMF ages, it transitions into a second phase of interpreta-
tion in which the text and legislative history of an AUMF are increas-
ingly utilized for assessing the lawfulness of executive action.207 As 
the emphasis increases as to these traditional tools for interpreting 
statutes, the persuasiveness of the functionalist justifications de-
creases correspondingly.208 
 While not as executive-friendly as a purely functionalist approach, 
the shift towards text and legislative history remains one in which 
executive action is highly likely to be considered lawful for multiple 
reasons. First, the circumstances in which AUMFs are drafted is one 
in which the Executive possesses an unusually high degree of influ-
ence.209 For the same reason, the legislative history is likely to be 
light, and that which exists is likely to weigh substantially toward a 
construction of broad statutory authorization.210  
 More subtly, judicial determinations established during the first 
interpretive phase are likely to significantly affect the outcome and 
framing of interpretive issues that arise subsequently.211 At its most 
basic level, this influence is one of application of precedent. As with 
precedent generally, the effect could possess the strength of binding 
law of a superior court decision on a lower court. More generally, 
even when decisions are not binding, the resolution of specific issues 
by earlier courts strongly influences the acceptable contours of the 
argument between the parties.212 
                                                                                                                                 
 206. See id. at 514-15. 
 207. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 208. One refrain frequently used by Presidents relates to the broad margins by which 
AUMFs tend to pass. For example, in a response to fifteen senators criticizing President 
Johnson’s escalation of armed conflict in Vietnam, he simply stated, “I continue to be guid-
ed in these matters by the resolution of the Congress approved on Aug. 10, 1964 – Public 
Law 88-408 – by a vote of 504 to 2.” Reply to a Letter from a Group of Senators Relating to 
the Situation in Vietnam, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
?pid=27748 (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
 209. In the case of the 2001 AUMF, the executive branch was not simply influential, it 
drafted the AUMF itself. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-
40): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2 (2007). 
 210. See United States v. Minoru Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40 (D. Or. 1942). 
 211. Garvin, supra note 112, at 706 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), as re-
flecting a pattern of the Court to seize the opportunity for “reinvigoration of civil liberties”). 
 212. See Kozel, supra note 153, at 964 (describing the separation of powers and federal-
ism envisioned by the founders as one of “structural institutionalism”). 
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 3.   Textless Democratic Functionalism 
 In classic statutory interpretation, emphasizing text serves to an-
chor the judiciary to legislative intent and, relatedly, as a legitimizer 
of the judicial function. However, as time progresses, circumstances 
inevitably change and democratic society grows increasingly divorced 
from the original, specific circumstances that drove the language em-
bedded in AUMF text.  
 As a result, continued adherence to the text-driven interpretive 
model perpetuates a legal paradigm powered more by inertial forces 
than democratic will.213 As set out above, the judiciary has frequently 
responded to this problem by adhering to its classic interpretive can-
ons in form, but deviating from them in practice. Of course, this pro-
duces precisely the questions of legitimacy and predictability that 
serve to undermine trust in the judicial branch. More damaging, this 
pattern fails to address the root causes of the divergent nature be-
tween judicial precedent and the inherent pressure that builds with 
the suppression of civil liberties and democratic values during armed 
conflict (represented or triggered by force authorization), which at 
best, produces piecemeal democratic response. 
 The move from a text-driven approach to a functionalist approach 
focusing on democratic norms reflects the reality of the unique cir-
cumstances of AUMF passage that strongly counsel against un-
checked continued authority. As the courts have recognized, even 
prior to the conclusion of armed conflict, the intensity of exigency 
subsides.214 As exigency subsides, embedded democratic values and 
separation of powers norms demand that should the nation continue 
to operate in what represents an emergency status, that decision is of 
the variety that should be presented and accepted after full consider-
ation, a prospect never present at the time original authorizations 
are enacted.  
 4.   Total Inoperability 
 Just over a decade following its enactment, Congressman Paul 
Findley sounded the alarm as to the “forgotten” 1957 Middle East 
AUMF and the potential for its broad delegations to the Executive to 
lead to war: 
                                                                                                                                 
 213. See id. 
 214. While Youngstown post-dates the Second World War, the basic moving operations 
of Justice Jackson’s three category test seemed relevant to jurists of the immediately pre-
ceding era. Compare Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) (granting habeas corpus relief 
to detained Japanese-American), with Minoru Yasui, 48 F. Supp. at 44 (assessing that 
Japanese internment during World War II necessarily requires “a premise, then, the exist-
ence of a war in which victory is a vital necessity to assure survival of the freedom of the 
individual guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, must be predicated”). 
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 This act has never been repealed. It has no specified date of ex-
piration. It is permanent law. 
 Let there be no mistake. This resolution, passed under circum-
stances in the Middle East which have radically changed in the in-
tervening thirteen years, requires neither consultation with Con-
gress nor congressional approval before the President can send 
American men to fight in a war.215 
 Mr. Findley’s attempt to repeal the authorization of force failed, 
and the 1957 Middle East Resolution remains valid, “permanent law” 
under existing doctrine. However, the notion that the 1957 Middle 
East Resolution is now fully inoperable rests on solid ground. The 
1957 Middle East Resolution was “all but forgotten” by 1969, and 
that year it seems the general consensus was “that the resolution is 
dormant and would never be cited.”216 
 The final phase of decay, total inoperability, simultaneously di-
rectly contradicts existing doctrine, reflects the consensus of norma-
tive view on the subject, and is the natural conclusion of the disinte-
grating authority of AUMFs explored thus far. Just as the shift from 
conflict functionalism to democratic functionalism reflects the reces-
sion of exigency, the progression to inoperability reflects the dissipa-
tion of conflict instrumentalities. Inoperability occurs when the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the force authorization in question are dis-
tant and the opportunity for deliberation present, such that the de-
fining traits of the original conflict simply cannot be said to solidly 
attach to new deployments.  
D.   Revived Institutionalism and Force Authorization Decay 
 Recognizing the phases of decay that attach to a congressional au-
thorization of force reinforces a variety of the institutionalist flaws 
present within the current system that are degrading separation of 
powers norms.  
 It is accepted wisdom that the executive branch possesses far 
greater competency in all aspects of foreign relations and national 
security compared to the other branches of government. The Execu-
tive is structured to be fast, unified, secret, and better resourced for 
fact gathering and consumption as well as for weighing various op-
tions and likely consequences. While merits to this wisdom accrue, 
complications and complexities abound, and it cannot be considered a 
static rule of thumb. First, disparity in competency among the 
branches on national security matters shrink over time as executive 
qualitative and quantitative advantages also lessen over time. The 
                                                                                                                                 
 215. 115 CONG. REC. 40,229 (1969) (statement of Rep. Findley). 
 216. Id. at 40,228. 
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most pressing issue of AUMF interpretation concerns resetting force 
authorization processes in order to capture the institutional compe-
tencies and advantages that reside in each of the political branches.  
 Understanding and applying the phases of force authorization de-
cay offers broad functional executive authority during the period in 
which such authority is most warranted—the period immediately 
following the passage of the AUMF. Devoid of an artificial mandate 
to hew to the hastily drafted text characteristic of force authoriza-
tions, both the judiciary and executive branch are free to read the 
mandate provided by Congress as one in pursuit of freshly identified 
objective. This focus on the functional necessities of conflict means 
that the “apex” of presidential power attained through Congress’s 
authorization as articulated in Youngstown captures the Court’s 
statement that war powers are fundamentally about the successful 
prosecution of armed conflict.217  
 As an institutional matter of balance between the political 
branches, decay offers broad functional executive authority even be-
yond the strictures of the text during the period in which such au-
thority is most warranted—immediately following passage—and pre-
cludes any reliance on authorizations that might formally empower 
presidential action but are outdated. As exigencies wane, recognizing 
that the AUMF is in a state of declining power encourages long-term, 
repeat engagement by the legislature rather than treating the pas-
sage of AUMFs as the conclusion of the legislature’s role in conduct-
ing hostilities. 
 At the core, AUMF statutory decay theory harnesses the institu-
tional advantages embedded in our separation of powers regime. It 
promotes long-term engagement, periodic reconsideration, and re-
legitimation of an AUMF’s threshold question of whether force 
should be used. It supports deliberative, democratic input and re-
finement regarding the limitations of how that force should be used. 
This process, if not democracy-forcing, is at least democracy-
enhancing. It enables public debate over a host of questions of utmost 
concern to the electorate that were unknown or inadequately ex-
plained at the initial time of authorization, such as economic and 
human cost, strategic error, etc. Periodic review and refinement 
likewise encourages a focused deliberation that might otherwise be-
come enmeshed in other issues, most notably the perpetual appropri-
ations discussions, and short-circuits negative predispositions toward 
inertia and responsibility shirking that naturally adhere to large in-
stitutions like Congress. 
                                                                                                                                 
 217. Similarly, recognizing such broad powers at the outset of AUMF passage should 
incentivize Congress to carefully consider AUMF passage and comports with Congress’s 
most recent practice of drafting broad authorization language.  
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 AUMF decay theory also offers a smooth transition away from the 
highly government-centric authority recognized in wartime toward 
the full application of the default peacetime domestic regime. Cur-
rent regime is always binary—based on an assessment of whether 
the U.S. is in conflict or not. However, in actuality, armed conflict 
does not follow an on/off pattern, nor should its imposition upon do-
mestic life be binary. AUMF decay is consistent with increasing 
recognition of the spectrum of intensity that characterizes armed con-
flict as well as the spectrum of functional impact that various con-
flicts impose within the domestic sphere. As such, decay is the more 
realistic and functionally attractive alternative to the congressional 
acts currently recognized in the current conflict-terminating regime 
of repeal, defunding, or proposed mandatory AUMF sunset, all of 
which portend substantial uncertain costs, political red tape, and po-
tentially dramatic legal shocks. As to the judiciary, decay theory of-
fers an opportunity to formalize, elucidate, and legitimate existing 
doctrine in a more coherent manner. Perhaps even more importantly, 
it offers an off-ramp from both assessments as to “some metaphysical 
test for war” and determinations regarding how to determine the 
“end” of conflicts.  
 As I have discussed, Congress’s comparative advantages, both de-
liberative and democratic, grow as an armed conflict grinds on. The 
same is true with the judiciary. Previously classified information is 
made available, independent fact-finders contribute to knowledge, 
and specific cases with distinct sets of facts that actually occurred, 
purportedly per the plan set into action by a force authorization, 
come forward for legal review. Like the legislature, Courts practice 
their own means of shirking responsibility or subsuming to inertia. 
They can decide a case on the merits or refuse to hear it as a political 
question. When accepting a case, they can defer to executive inter-
pretations or ignore deference all together.  
 Absent a workable model for AUMF interpretation that recognizes 
their unusual character and origins, the institutional competencies 
upon which separation of powers doctrine relies are too easily over-
whelmed. Overly diminished roles of Congress and the courts lose 
sight of their functionally valuable and constitutionally supported 
contributions to assessing and legitimizing the use of military force 
over time. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Institutional principles and historical practice demand that tem-
poral conditions and implicit force authorization obsolescence inform 
a model for interpreting congressional authorizations for the use of 
military force. Evidence of force authorization decay manifests in the 
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decisions and actions of all three branches of government, yet is un-
articulated in doctrine. Acknowledging decay theory as to AUMF in-
terpretation rebuilds governmental checks, which have been com-
promised over the past half a century. Timeless grants of armed con-
flict power don’t simply enhance the authority of the executive 
branch, they constrict the functional authority of Congress and the 
judiciary. A phased constriction in AUMF statutory authority over 
time enables unhindered executive action at times most appropriate 
and a built-in—but not cliff-like—falloff in unchecked authority as 
exigency moves toward normalcy. 
